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Abstract 
 
 Sudans region of Darfur has been experiencing an internal war which has killed 
hundreds of thousands and displaced millions of the civilian population.  For the past two 
years, the international community has been attempting to protect Darfurs inhabitants 
through a variety of political, security and humanitarian endeavors. However, death and 
displacement continue at an alerting rate. The purpose of this study is to define the 
problems the international community is encountering and propose potential solutions to 
provide more effective protection.  The data for the study has been collected utilizing 
semi-structured qualitative interviews from a panel of ten experts who are intimately 
familiar with the protection efforts of the international community in Darfur. This 
synthesis of the suggestions of the interviewees will hopefully be helpful in guiding the 
international communitys operations to more effectively address the protection needs of 
the local population and bring an enduring peace to the region. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, a new securitization has emerged to protect the 
rights of civilians affected by conflict (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).  This might be in 
response to the rise in internal conflicts in which the overwhelming majority of 
causalities have shifted from military personnel to civilians. It is reported that 90% of all 
casualties occurring in intra-state conflicts today are non-combatants (United Nations 
Development Project, 2002).  
Led by the United Nations (UN) and supported by regional partners, member 
states, and various agencies, the international community (IC) has incorporated a wide 
range of diplomatic, security and humanitarian activities in order to provide for the 
protection of civilians (POC) (United Nations Security Council, 1999).  The recent 
securitization of protection by the IC has become all the more evident in the civil war 
torn state of Sudan. The IC spearheaded by the UN and its regional counterpart the 
African Union (AU) has been actively involved in protection operations on behalf of the 
Sudanese citizens. One domestic conflict in Sudan benefiting from the ICs protection 
efforts is the western region of Darfur.  The three year conflict in Darfur has resulted in 
the deaths of around 200,000 people and the displacement of two million, a quarter of the 
total population (United Nations Daily News, 2005b). 
 The IC has been attempting to protect the civilians of Darfur who have been 
affected by internal conflict between state and non-state actors which are influenced by 
the dynamics of the region.  As the conflict drags on into its third year, the ICs efforts 
are being questioned about their effectiveness in providing for civilian protection.   
Due to the protracted involvement of the IC, its diplomatic, security, and 
humanitarian operations might stand to benefit from an examination by a panel of ten 
experts with hands-on experience in the protection activities for Darfur.  Based on their 
input, the aim of this study is to determine the problems the IC is experiencing with its 
efforts to protect the citizens of Darfur and what can be done to most effectively address 
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these difficulties.  In order to best capture the practitioners opinions, the methodological 
framework to gather the data for the study utilized semi-structured qualitative interviews. 
Given the complicated nature of the conflict, the study used theory to analyze 
some of the data collected.  Walters credible commitment theory (2002) was employed 
to focus on the diplomatic efforts of the IC, guided by the AU, to get a negotiated 
settlement out of the peace talks being discussed in Abuja, Nigeria.  The study 
hypothesizes that one of the main reasons for the lack of POC in Darfur is that the 
warring parties have not abided by political commitments they have made in the past.  
This lack of commitment might be best addressed by Walters theory in the application of 
post-conflict power sharing and third party security guarantees to encourage the 
negotiating parties to honor their negotiated agreements.  
The IC has operated under the assumption that if there is a commitment to peace 
agreement in place, then by definition there will be safety for civilians (Stiansen, 2006 
[Interview]).   As a result, the other two components of POC, the ICs security and 
humanitarian activities, could stand to benefit by a peace settlement to which all parties 
adhere. Due to the contemporary nature of the conflict, the security and humanitarian 
endeavors were explored without the guidance of theory or hypothesis in order to be 
more adept in understanding the protection challenges faced by the IC and what measures 
can address them. When examining this on-going phenomenon, the data collected is 
based on events up until April 2006.   
 The study followed a structured format. Chapter two provides a more detailed 
understanding of the conflicts which plague Sudan with attention on Darfur and 
background on the POC concept. Chapter three describes POC violations by the warring 
parties and the ICs efforts and impact in addressing them. Chapter four outlines the 
research design for the study by presenting the problem, research questions, hypotheses, 
and methodology. Chapter five describes and discusses the results that were collected. 
Finally, chapter six presents conclusions of the study, along with the implications for the 
POC field and for further research. 
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2.0 Background on conflict in Sudan and the protection of civilian concept 
 
2.1 Background of internal conflict in Sudan 
The Republic of Sudan is the largest state in terms of land area on the continent of 
Africa. Sudan with its population of 35 million is one of the poorest and least developed 
countries in the world, with most of its citizens dependent on farming and animal 
husbandry for their livelihoods (CIA World Factbook, 2005).  The nation ranks 141 out 
of 177 countries on the United Nations Programs Human Development Index in terms of 
its standard of living (United Nations Development Project, 2005).  This colonial 
constructed country has been in a constant state of struggle since its independence from 
England 50 years ago.  The political government of Sudan (GoS) has followed a pattern 
of military regimes in support of Arab, Islamic-oriented governments (CIA World 
Factbook, 2005). These governments have typically come to power by way of coups and 
have remained in control using any means necessary (Warburg, 2002).    
The GoS has fought two extended civil wars with their non-Arab, non-Muslim 
counterparts in the south of the country in an attempt to hold the state together.  These 
internal struggles are considered to comprise the longest civil war in Africa to date 
(Norwegian Council for Africa, 2003).  The conflict between the GoS of the north and 
the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) representing the south, are rooted 
in what is seen as a political and economic marginalization of the southern areas outside 
the GoSs nexus of power in the Upper Nile Valley region of Khartoum (Deng, 1995).  
This marginalization is based on a clash of contrasting and seemingly incompatible 
identities between the Arab north and the African south of the country (Ibid).   
The past 20 years have witnessed the conflict between the north and the south 
producing a death toll of two million and displacing over four million of the civilian 
population (Norwegian Council for Africa, 2003).  In January 2005, the GoS and SPLM 
signed a peace agreement in Nairobi, Kenya that ended the hostilities between both sides.  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided power-sharing, wealth-sharing, 
and external third party security guarantees by the UN for the two parties 
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(Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2005).  It has also granted the SPLM 
political autonomy for the south for a period of six years, until a referendum for 
independence can be held (Ibid). 
Unfortunately, the recent achievements of the CPA in concluding the conflict 
between the north and south have been overshadowed by an increase in fighting both in 
the eastern and western parts of the country.  Starting in 2004, the east of Sudan has been 
shaken by violence between the GoS and various rebel groups such as the Beja Congress. 
These groups, known collectively as the Eastern Front, have retaken areas vacated by the 
withdrawing of the SPLM (Economist, 2005a).  Supported by Eritrea, this low-intensity 
conflict of eastern Sudan threatens the GoSs oil interests (Ibid).  The extraction of oil 
from Sudan has increased the Gross Domestic Product by an impressive 8.6% in 2004 
(CIA World Factbook, 2005).  Its discovery has also attracted desperately needed foreign 
oil investment from countries like China, India, and Malaysia to diversify the agricultural 
base economy of Sudan (Afrol News, 2005).      
As noted by the International Crisis Group (2006a) on a report of the eastern 
region of Sudan, the escalation of violence is attributed to the same political and 
economic underdevelopment that has been cited as cause for the conflict between the 
north and south.  The Eastern Front saw the achievements that its southern counterpart, 
the SPLM, has made waging war with the GoS by getting a peace agreement that finally 
began to alleviate the marginalization of the south.  The exclusion of the Eastern Front 
from the CPA has resulted in a low-intensity counterinsurgency that runs a major risk of 
exploding into an all-out conflict threatening the civilians of the region, international oil 
interests and involving regional dynamics such as Eritreas support for the Eastern Front 
(Ibid).  The GoS is reported as having three times as many troops in the relatively small 
eastern part of the country as in the larger region of Darfur to protect its precious flow of 
oil through a pipeline to Port Sudan (Economist, 2005a). 
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2.1.1 Internal conflict in Darfur    
The exclusion of people and areas outside the north and south of the country from 
the CPA has created second-tier conflicts which are intra-state and intra-regional in 
nature (Mbugua, 2005).  The most distinguished case of this occurring is in the western 
part of the country in Darfur.  This inland region with a population of around seven 
million has witnessed an increase in violence that has been described as genocide by the 
United States government (Washington Post, 2004).    
The geographically isolated three provinces of Darfur have had a long history of 
neglect by the British and the GoS (Prunier, 2005).  Their political and economic 
marginalization has resulted in a state within a state where gross underdevelopment is the 
norm rather than the exception.  The poverty of the region has resulted in a certain level 
of violence being acceptable in Darfur by the authorities in Khartoum (Flint and De 
Waal, 2005).  Banditry and lawlessness have plagued this region that borders Chad for 
the past few hundreds of years.    
Until a few years ago, not much attention was ever paid by Khartoum or outside 
Sudan to this inaccessible territory (Ibid).  Darfurs history of underdevelopment had 
been a way of life for its people, who had occasionally used violence to voice their 
frustrations, but on a small scale.  The fragmentation of Darfur with its composition of 
various tribes and different socio-economic ways of life has made it difficult for the 
region to put together a cohesive struggle against the GoS and its marginalization of the 
region (Prunier, 2005).   
The historical lead to the widespread violence that plagues Darfur today is rooted 
in four factors.  The first is that of the marginalization of the Darfur provinces.  Recent 
evidence to this can be documented in the kitab al-aswad, or so-called Black Book, 
literally spelling out the monopoly by Arab tribes in the Nile Valley of Khartoum and the 
subjugation of the Darfur region. Written anonymously, the book (2000) makes a 
statistically structured case of what has been known all along by the people of Sudan.   It 
describes how almost all of the political and material power of Sudan resides in just 5% 
of the total population in the Upper Nile valley of the north.  Despite Darfur having 30% 
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of the population of the entire country, Darfur has received on average a grossly unjust 
proportion of the cabinet level appointments to government and just about 4% of the total 
national wealth to its three provinces (Ibid). 
The second factor seen as a catalyst to the upsurge in violence in Darfur is that of 
the success of the SPLM in its political negotiations with the GoS after years of civil war. 
With 24% of the population, the south represented by the SPLM, will receive 30% of all 
jobs within the governments central administration and will divide the oil revenue from 
the south 50-50 with the GoS (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2005).   
These quite generous terms by the CPA have inspired the regions of the east and west to 
seek out armed struggle as a means by which to force the GoS to the negotiation table in 
hopes of improving the lopsided balance of political power and economic wealth among 
the regions of Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2006a). 
The third factor which has set the stage for the internal strife in Darfur is the 
scarcity of resources that has beset this barren territory in the past 20 years (De Waal, 
2005). The socio-economic make-up of the region had created two distinct ways of life. 
The agriculturist tribes of the Darfur who are Islamic Africans and the nomadic 
Arabs tribes, who had previously enjoyed a harmonious relationship of cooperation, 
began to have to compete over land and water resources that are not able to support both 
ways of life (Ibid).   
Due to changing climatic conditions beginning in 1984, a severe famine hit the 
horn region of Africa (Prunier, 2005).  Its impression inspired the western music 
community to write songs about it like We are the World and to televise one of the first 
global relief concerts.  Unfortunately, this embodiment of a collective spirit had a 
difficult time finding its way out to the landlocked region of Darfur in way of food relief 
(Ibid).  
The famine of 1984 changed the means of existence for the settled African 
farming communities and the nomadic Arab tribes of Darfur. Author Alex De Waal 
(2005) highlights how the drought shrunk the grazing resources of the nomadic 
population.  The settled farmers had to fence off their cultivated lands and watering holes 
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to protect their meager resources.  This blocked the traditional migratory routes of the 
nomads who were moving from the dry north regions of Darfur to the wet southern parts 
on a seasonal basis.  The pastoralists had to resort to fighting their way through the 
fenced off communities of the agriculturists.  The battle over land upset the mutual 
dependence to which the two communities had grown accustomed in their commercial 
activities of trading with one another (Ibid).  The polarization of the two sides was only 
to be exacerbated when the region of Darfur was turned into a launch pad for Libyan 
attacks into neighboring Chad. 
The fourth ingredient that prepared the explosive cocktail for the situation in 
Darfur today was the arming of the Darfur by its neighbors, Chad and Libya in the mid to 
late 1980s. Gerard Prunier (2005) in his book, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, gives 
an historical account of the important roles Chad and Libya played in Darfur in the wake 
of the devastating famine of 1984. The GoS let the polarization of the Darfur occur 
between the African and Arab communities by Chad and Libya to deflect the neglect 
of the region by the GoS itself (Ibid).  
Prunier (2005) describes how in a desperate need to finance its war against the 
SPLM of the south, the GoS under the leadership of Sadiq al-Mahdi permitted the 
presence of the Libyan military on Darfur soil.  The Libyans began arming the local 
Arab nomadic tribes to prepare for an invasion into Chad.  It was within this context 
that the infamous word, Janjaweed, was first mentioned to describe the local elements of 
Libyas Arab allies fighting along constructed lines of ethnicity.   In order to combat 
the Libyan threat, Chad funneled weapons into the African tribes of the territory and 
the ethnic cleavages between the two communities took on more substance (Ibid).   
Raids across the border between Chad and Darfur began to occur frequently.  In 
fact, the current President of Chad, Idriss Deby, launched his take over of the country 
from Darfur backed by Libya in 1989.  Once Omar Gaddafi had a pro-Libyan president in 
Chad in place, the Libyan interest in Darfur waned and the region was vacated by the 
Libyans.  In their wake was an impoverished area divided along ethnic lines flooded with 
weapons (Ibid). 
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The past 15 years have let the ethnic divisions along land usage solidify within a 
region that has been abandoned by the central government of Khartoum.  The general 
lawlessness and discontent of the Darfur provinces have permitted a festering of malice 
towards the GoS.  The 1990s observed occasional acts of sporadic violence towards the 
GoS (Flint and De Waal, 2005). However, it was not until February of 2003 that the 
region erupted into organized violence on a widespread scale based on the four 
previously listed factors.  The two main anti-government groups, the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), attacked government 
garrisons in Darfur and the GoS began to mobilize to crush the rebellion by force (Mans, 
2004).   
All of the non-state fighting parties involved in Darfur such as, the JEM, the SLM 
and the Janjaweed, are said to be composed mostly of unemployed young men who have 
turned to these armed groups as means for making a living in a region that is plagued 
with poverty and lack of opportunity (Ibid). Such a condition of having so many 
unemployed young males without an economic future is noted by scholar, Paul Collier 
(2001), as being a prevailing factor found in common with many civil wars in Africa. 
In the eyes of the GoS, the Darfur conflict is based on a war of aggression since 
the GoS military came under rebel attack first (Mans, 2004).  The GoSs heavy handed 
tactics in response to the counter-insurgency appear to be aimed at the civilians based on 
reports conducted for the UN Security Council (International Commission of Inquiry 
2005; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005).  This 
approach has quickly carried the region of Darfur into a crisis situation which so much of 
the international communitys resources and attention are aimed at curbing the violence 
directed towards the local population.    
 
2.1.1.1 Actors and levels involved in the conflict in Darfur.  Within the context of 
the conflict of Darfur there is the involvement of state and non-state actors who operate at 
the local, state and regional levels.  At the root of the conflict there is the GoS, the main 
state unit at which the aggressions of the opposition groups of Darfur are directed.  The 
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JEM and the SLM are two of the non-state actors which are fighting against the GoS in 
response to what they claim are decades of political and economic neglect of their region 
(Mans, 2004). However, both the JEM and the SLM have very different backgrounds. 
The SLM contains some elements of the SPLM, the main opposition group in the south, 
who for years has tried, but failed to establish a second battlefront in Darfur to combat 
the GoS during the early 1990s (Ibid). The JEM, on the other hand, is an Islamic 
organization guided under the teachings of Hassan al-Turabi, a well-known leader in 
Sudans political arena (BBC News, 2006b). The JEM is viewed as more of an extremist 
Islamic element within the political landscape of Darfur (Ibid).   Along with the JEM and 
the SLM are a myriad of smaller tribal factions and other armed militias that operate in 
Darfur both in support and against the GoS. These groups have not come to receive the 
same diplomatic attention that the JEM and the SLM have. However, their presence adds 
to the chaotic landscape of Darfur with all of its various tribal and ethnic groups.  It can 
be difficult to grasp where the true interests of the people lie with so many local factions 
waging war in Darfur.  
Within the GoS camp, there are non-state units serving as the GoSs proxy 
military arm in the Darfur region (International Commission of Inquiry, 2005).  Arab 
militia groups like the infamous Janjaweed, composed of elements of the nomadic 
population, is a force which the GoS is using to wage much of its war in Darfur.  The 
Janjaweed operates with complete impunity from the GoS and has been mentioned by the 
ICs observers in the region as the one actor who carries out many of the atrocities 
directed at civilians (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2005).  This local actor with state support is a main element in the Darfur conflict.  
 As noted by Prunier (2005) outside the state and local levels, there is also the 
influence of the regional powers which have exerted influence and control within Darfur.  
Chad and Libya have in the past waged war against one another through the lawless 
conduit of Darfur.  Their impact on the Darfur region has resulted in the rise of 
importance of the regional level.  In the conflict crisis itself, the funneling of weapons to 
the opposition parties by Sudans neighbors, such as Chad, Libya and Eritrea are noted as 
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having a profound manipulation on its security dynamics (United Nations Security 
Council Committee, 2005).  Such an influence can be explained by Buzans and Wævers 
(2003) post-Cold war theory, Regional Security Complex Theory.  This theory postulates 
that the removal of the bi-polar overlay of the superpowers at the global level will permit 
more room for the regional level to operate.  This is based on its main tenet that threats 
are more likely to travel over shorter distances than longer ones.  The role of geography 
is to have more of an impact on security relations which is all the more evident in the 
case of the Darfur where regional dynamics have taken on a lead role.   
 Along with the rise in importance of the regional level in Darfur, as captured by 
Buzans and Wæavers Regional Security Complex theory, is the acknowledgement of 
new securitizations which have arisen after the Cold War. No longer is territoriality the 
sole justification for the IC to concern itself in the affairs of states (Ibid). The IC has 
embarked on a journey to protect civilians right to life and dignity if their government is 
unwilling or unable to do. Darfur has become a stage where the IC acts out this new 
securitization. In order to understand the protection concept is necessary to provide some 
background and a working definition which the IC follows.  
 
2.2 The International Communitys concept of Protection of Civilians 
The UN first mentioned the concept of protection of civilians in 1998 by the 
Secretary-General in a situation report on Africa (United Nations, 1998).  The phrase is 
an encompassing concept of humanitarian policies which brings together protection 
elements from a number of fields.  The definition of protection of civilians in armed 
conflict employed by the UN is:   
'Structures and Policies developed by the United Nations, States and other 
humanitarian actors, and based in humanitarian law, human rights and refugee 
law, to protect vulnerable populations from the effects of armed conflict, ranging 
from the most immediate priorities of minimizing civilian causalities to more 
long-term priorities of promoting rule of law and security, law and order within a 
State (United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Activities, 2003). 
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The sources of these three laws (humanitarian, human rights and refugee) are 
based on treaties and customary international law. Customary international laws are 
unwritten norms created by practices that are adhered to by states out of a sense of legal 
obligation (Slim, 2002). Examples of these customary laws or norms are the prohibition 
of slavery or genocide.  As by the IC, protection of civilians is viewed as a duty by the 
state.  If the state is unwilling or unable to comply with the protection standard set by the 
three laws, a trend is emerging by the IC to take it upon itself to provide for the safety of 
the states civilians (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). 
As stressed by Slim (2002: 159), when providing for the protection of another 
states citizens, the IC has taken on broad operationalization of the term  to describe 
all forms of humanitarian action, military intervention, social, economic and legal action 
in support of civilians in war.  This is a giant step forward from the protection activities 
that the IC limited itself to during the Cold War which strictly dealt with determining the 
status of refugees or prisoners of war discussed within specialized circles of international 
lawyers (Ibid).  As evident in Darfur the concept of POC has ballooned into an 
undertaking which, when put into practice, is not a trivial exercise. 
In truth, the definition of POC seems to come across as the main 
operationalization within the United Nations own Founding Charter whose preamble 
reads:  
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom...(United Nations, 1945:1). 
 
The context of the Founding Charter was written in the aftermath of two inter-state 
world wars, yet its message to assert the fundamental rights of humanity under a banner 
of legal obligations is clearly echoed today. For the citizens of its member states this 
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would take some time before its fruition, with the UN left paralyzed for the next 50 years 
by the Cold War that was to immediately follow its inception.   
The securitization of human rights would be re-established after the end of the 
Cold War (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).  This watershed in international relations witnessed 
a rebirth in the ideals upon which the UN had originally been based.  The UN began a 
campaign to uphold and enforce a magnitude of treaties and laws such as the Geneva 
Conventions directed at preserving the individuals inalienable rights to life and liberty 
that had been tabled during the Cold War (United Nations Security Council, 1999).  This 
means that the IC has begun to involve itself in the affairs of its member states.  In doing 
such, the issue of sovereignty comes into play. Sovereignty is a previously untouchable 
concept has taken a backseat to the issue of human rights. Organizations like the African 
Union whose previous Charter from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, 
preached a maximum of non-interference in the affairs of its member states (Organization 
of African Unity, 1963).  Now the concept of sovereignty can be questioned within the 
context of this emerging norm of civilian protection.   
The case in Darfur is one of the first new undertakings of the newly created AU to 
subject a members sovereignty to the POC concept.  Sudan, acting on its own accord, 
has bound itself to a number of laws and treaties which it is legally obligated to uphold.  
These responsibilities are beginning to be enforced for the first time by the IC for all the 
parties in Darfur.  Before these obligations to protect by the Sudanese parties can be 
described, it is first necessary to map out the players and levels which compose the IC in 
Darfur.  
 
2.2.1 Actors, Levels, and Securitization concerning the International Communitys 
Protection Activities in Darfur 
The protection of civilians is one of the justifications used by the IC to engage 
itself in the inter-workings of Darfur (United Nations Security Council, 2004a). The 
international community has worked its way into the dynamics of the situation with this 
latest securitization.  At first glance, the IC appears to act as a cohesive entity 
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representing interests of all of its members (United Nations General Assembly, 2005).  
However in Darfur, there are fault lines which are starting to emerge with the ICs 
handling of the POC crisis.  This adds some doubt as to its collective nature in 
implementing its protection operations.  
 The term, the international community, refers to a massive body composed at the 
global, regional, state, and agency levels. Based on remarks by UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan (1999), the definition which this study has embraced is that the international 
community is led by the UN and composed of its regional partners, member states, and 
various agencies.  Its members are both state and non-state actors.  These member nation-
states run the gamut of pre-modern states, modern states, and post-modern states.  The 
regional organizations based on these states are as a result founded on a varying degree of 
economic, social and political progresses.  The agencies which are included within the IC 
are also viewed as representing a wide variety of platforms.  All these units comprise a 
complex body which is attempting to wield itself in a uniform manner regarding the ICs 
POC efforts. 
 At the global level there is the superpower presence of the US, which is seen as 
having ability to influence the warring parties in Darfur and the overall agenda of the IC 
(Buzan and Wæver, 2003).  On that same plane, there is the non-state unit, the UN, which 
is able to act globally with its current count of overseeing 15 peacekeeping operations 
comprised of 70,000 troops (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 2006).  
Understandably, the UN is only as strong as its political ruling body, the UNs 
Security Council, will let it be.  The permanent members that sit on the UN - England, 
France, Russia, China and the US  are the agents from whom the UN draws its main will 
and ability to act.  Within the permanent members of the Security Council there is a 
varying degree of political, economic and social development.  On one side of the fence 
there is England, France, and the US, who have democratic governments and a publicized 
record of promoting human rights.  On the other side there is China and Russia, who have 
been noted as not being the champions of human rights as their western counterparts.  In 
past experiences, such as the US led invasion of Iraq, even getting such western, 
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developed nations as England and France to pull together can be a cumbersome 
challenge. 
Almost on par with these states is the post-modern construction, the European 
Union (EU).  Just like the UN, this regional body is only as strong as the will of its 
member states. The EU is an advocate for human rights and is funding 60% of the 
African Unions peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 2006a).  At the same 
regional level, there is the AU, although it is not as financially stable or politically and 
socially developed. This regional organization is very dependent on its western 
supporters for its operations.  In the case of POC in Darfur, the IC has turned to the AU 
to direct the security and diplomatic efforts in solving the crisis (United Nations Security 
Council, 2004a).  The AU is composed almost entirely of pre-modern states that are 
recognized as having strikingly similar problems which are associated with weak or 
failing states like the Sudan (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).  
Playing a limited role, but assisting the AU is the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization known as NATO.  This military collective is using its vast logistical and 
training resources to supplement the AUs efforts in Darfur (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 2006).  Though purely a military outfit, NATO has had a track record in 
the Balkans and Afghanistan of providing safety for civilians. 
There are other regional organizations like the Arab League which is composed of 
states that have some economic clout, but with shortcomings in its members political and 
social stature.  The Arab League has been critical of the western led initiative in Darfur 
due to previously led US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.  All four of these very 
different collective organizations make up the IC at the regional level in regard to its 
POC activities in Darfur. 
At the state level, there is a mixture of units which have taken an interest in 
Darfur.  Many are developed western nations which first became involved in Sudan as a 
result of supporting the Christian south of the country in its armed struggle against the 
Arab north with humanitarian assistance during the civil wars.  EU and Non-EU members 
like Norway and Canada have continued to play a role in the Sudan by assisting the 
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protection efforts of the IC in Darfur. On the opposite side of the spectrum, there are 
individual Middle Eastern states which are funneling either financial or political support 
to the GoS to combat the infringement on Sudanese sovereignty by the west in its efforts 
to securitize the rights of the individual in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 2006b).  At the state 
level, the humanitarian situation in Darfur appears to have divided the IC along cultural 
and developmental lines. 
At the agency level, the UN supported institutions, non-governmental (NGOs) and 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and International Committee for the Red 
Cross, to name a few, have taken on a very active role concerning the ICs protection 
activities.  There have been new developments concerning these agencies roles by 
building capacity within the warring parties by promoting awareness of their human 
rights obligations and even facilitating negotiation between the parties in Darfur.  These 
roles have in the past been typically reserved for just state actors (Buzan and Wæver, 
2003).  However, the post-Cold environment has really opened up the playing field for 
non-state actors in international relations (Ibid).     
   The ICs efforts in Darfur highlight a post-modern agenda which is testing the 
commitment of the ICs members.  The securitization of human rights is a new concept 
for the IC that has recently picked up steam in the post-Cold War era (Ibid).  The 
developed western states and collective organizations that represent them, like the 
European Union or the United Nations, have come to prioritize the importance of the 
individual to that of the state.   
During the Cold War, the only securitization that caused states to intervene in each 
others affairs was the issue of territoriality (Ibid).  Now some members of the IC have 
monopolized and expanded the security agenda of the IC with a post-modern outlook.  
These wealthy members are typically the ones who have a secure, developed state 
structure and no longer have to fear the violent transfer of power which is still common in 
many other less developed countries (Ibid).  As a result, the POC situation in Darfur is 
serving as litmus test for the IC.  With all its various members, the IC is struggling to 
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overcome its diverse nature to insure that the lives and welfare of the citizens of Darfur 
will be protected.   
It is ironic that in such an inland, backwater region of the world, Darfur is 
witnessing so many different actors interacting at various levels in an attempt to come to 
its populations aid.  The ICs efforts in enforcing a new securitization will serve as an 
experiment to determine future POC operations.  With the map of the actors and levels 
laid out, POC can be explained in the context of Darfur concerning the obligations to 
protect by the warring parties. 
 
2.2.2 Obligations of the GoS and warring factions for the protection of civilians 
Prior to the eruption of conflict in Darfur, the GoS was a signatory to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which are the most noted examples of international 
humanitarian law in times of conflict (International Commission for the Red Cross, 
2003).  In regard to the conflict in Darfur, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is of 
significant importance.  This convention deals specifically with the protection of civilians 
during times of war (International Commission for the Red Cross, 1949).  The other three 
Geneva Conventions are related to the treatment of combatants as prisoners of war or 
causalities (American Red Cross, 2001). 
In order for the Fourth Geneva Convention to be applied to an internal armed 
conflict, the conflict must meet the definition of war (International Commission for the 
Red Cross, 1949).  There are varying interpretations of what war is, from the Uppsala 
University definition of a minimum 25 battlefield deaths a year to the Correlations of 
War project that suggests a minimum 1,000 battlefield deaths a year (Sollenberg, 1998; 
Singer, 1976).  Regardless, it can be reasonably argued that the Darfur region is 
experiencing a conflict that easily satisfies the criteria for the definition of war.  The 
conflict in Darfur has moved well beyond the random acts of banditry and aggressions of 
a low-intensity conflict that the GoS has assigned to it.  The number of dead as a result of 
the conflict is put at a conservative 200,000 in just two years (United Nations Daily 
News, 2005b).     
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The Fourth Geneva Convention affirms the state and its internal opposition parties 
must protect the people who are taking no part of the conflict from murder, rape, torture 
and inhuman treatment (International Commission for the Red Cross, 1949).  The actors 
in the conflict must also provide humanitarian access to neutral organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to assist all affected parties and populations 
(Ibid).    
It is also the duty of the GoS as a state that is bound to the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law to protect its own civilians against acts of violence, acts of 
pillaging, and to ensure that when its military is attacking rebel objectives, that the 
civilian causalities are not disproportionate to its own anticipated military gain (Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005).   
The GoS is party to a long list of treaties expressing this protection concept. Noted 
examples include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United 
Nations General Assembly, 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1966b).  Within these two 
covenants specific articles pertain to: the freedom of movement, right to property, right to 
adequate housing, non-subjection to forced eviction, right to health and right to adequate 
food and water.  All of these articles fit within the protection wrapper the IC has made a 
priority to enforce.   
The GoS has undoubtedly declared a willingness to be a member of the IC and its 
agenda to protect civilians in armed conflict by signing these treaties.  Yet, in recent 
years there has been documented evidence that this is not the case in Darfur.  Long lists 
of atrocities have been cited in violation of the previously listed treaties and obligations 
which the GoS supports (African Union Ceasefire Commission, 2006).  Acts of violence 
in Darfur against its inhabitants have been recorded by many different facets of the IC 
(Ibid; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005).  A 
clear case can be made that the warring parties and most troubling, the GoS, are in 
outright defiance of their contractual obligation to protect their citizens. 
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2.3 Summary 
Chapter two has provided the background on the conflicts in Sudan with special 
attention on the region of Darfur. The actors and levels have been mapped out to assist in 
the understanding of all the parties involved. With the contextual background presented, a 
brief history and working definition of POC has been supplied along with a description of 
its operationalization. The study has also listed all the units, levels and securitization of 
the international community which are viewed as influencing the POC concept in regards 
to Darfur.  Due to the crowded landscape of the ICs involvement, order has been 
instilled by dividing the players into different levels.   
Within the perspective of Sudan, an account has been presented of all the warring 
parties responsibilities to protect their population as a result of treaties they have signed 
and laws they have committed themselves to follow.  The background on the Darfur 
conflict and POC concept will transition into the violations of POC which have been 
carried out by the fighting parties in Darfur and the international communitys efforts and 
impact thus far in attempting to lessen their harmful effects on the inhabitants of the 
region.  
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3.0 Violations of the protection of civilians in Darfur and the international communitys 
efforts and impact in addressing them 
 
3.1 Violations by the Government of Sudan and warring factions regarding the protection 
of civilians in Darfur 
Mandated by the United Nations Security Council in Resolutions 1564        
(United Nations Security Council, 2004b) and 1591 (United Nations Security Council, 
2005), investigations into the allegations of violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law have been published in two reports: the Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (International 
Commission of Inquiry, 2005) and the Second Periodic Report of the United Nations 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan (Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005).  Both these reports address 
the allegations of abuses by the GoS and warring factions in the context of Darfur within 
a period from early 2003 to late 2005.  These reports, supplemented by reports of the 
African Union Ceasefire Commission (2006) and NGOs published accounts like the 
Physicians for Human Rights (2005), document a long list of atrocities which breach the 
humanitarian treaties and laws the GoS and its opposition parties are obliged to uphold. 
 The UN reports assert two irrefutable facts regarding actions taken against the 
citizens of Darfur (International Commission of Inquiry, 2005; Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005).  The first is that there has been 
massive displacement of the population both internally and externally into neighboring 
Chad.  Millions of people have been forced to leave their homes. Second, there has been 
large-scale destruction of villages within the three provinces of the region.  As stated in 
the reports, this is based on an abundance of physical evidence of villages being burned 
down with only their walls left standing to acknowledge their previous existence.   
  Based on eyewitness testimonials from the UN reports by thousands of refugees 
and internal displaced persons (IDPs), a pattern of humanitarian abuses has emerged 
within the reports (Ibid).  Government troops in uniform, accompanied by local 
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Janjaweed militia groups, and in most cases with aircraft support, surprised and attacked 
villages with deliberate and indiscriminate violence directed at its civilian population.  
Documented acts of violence include: the killing of civilians, rape, pillaging, destruction 
of property and forced displacement.  These acts occurred on an organized, widespread 
scale throughout all Darfur.  Those who were most affected were the settled, farming 
communities in this inhospitable environment whose populations were required to flee to 
escape the violence (Ibid). 
 With its location at the foot of the Sahara desert, the terrain of Darfur is a difficult 
place to survive.  As noted by the reports, without the protection of their villages from the 
extreme elements, many people died as a result of starvation, dehydration, and disease.  
The Physicians Report (2005) on its survey of three separate villages point out that 
household averages for each family had been halved from twelve members to six 
members as a direct or indirect result of the attacks.  The elimination of access to food, 
water, shelter, and medicine along with a complete loss of farmland, livestock, and all 
earthly possessions has created a population whose ability to survive has been severely 
limited (Ibid).   
With land being the main source of wealth for the people of Darfur, the forced 
displacement has taken away any and all means for making a living. Along with the lack 
of infrastructure in Darfur, the ability to provide basic services to the civilians has fallen 
completely on the shoulders of the IC. Unfortunately, the GoS is being very obstinate in 
permitting humanitarian assistance to be carried out in Darfur.  Visas have been routinely 
denied, food aid obstructed from reaching its intended destination, and even the 
humanitarian worker themselves have been held hostage (International Commission of 
Inquiry, 2005; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2005). The task of providing basic services for the civilians of Darfur has become a 
struggle for the relief organizations attempting to cooperate with the GoS as well as rebel 
groups. These obstructions are a blatant breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Ibid). 
 The above mentioned actions taken against the civilian population and 
humanitarian workers are in direct violation of the treaties and customary international 
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laws to which the GoS and warring fractions are a party (Ibid).  Specifically in the 
unforgiving environmental context of Darfur, depriving the population of adequate 
housing, food, and water can severely decrease the chances of survival.  One repeated 
story within the Physicians report is a survivor overhearing one attacker telling another, 
Dont even bother.  Dont waste the bullet. Theyve got nothing to eat. Theyll die from 
hunger (Physicians Report, 2005: 69, 93).   
The GoS has answered these allegations of violations from the UN reports by 
saying that it carried out attacks on villages that were in response to rebel activity being 
conducted in the area.  There are two faults to this argument as highlighted by the UN 
Security Council mandated reports (International Commission of Inquiry, 2005; Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005).  The first is that even 
if rebels were in the area or the village themselves, the citizens were never given any 
warning or ability to leave before the battle took place.  The commissions found that a 
rebel presence was only in the villages in a very small number of cases.   Moreover, even 
if the rebels were present, the military attacks on the civilians, their property, their homes, 
their livestock, and land were significantly disproportionate to any threat posed by the 
rebels.  This is a violation of customary international law (Ibid).  
Along with the human rights abuses of the GoS documented by the UN reports 
there has also been a pattern of failing to protect the civilians of Darfur.  The GoS has 
had a legal obligation to prevent the attacks, as well as to bring the perpetrators to justice.  
One noted example representing this case and point is when the GoS in September of 
2005 stood idly by while the village of Guzminu was attacked within 300 meters of a 
GoS army base. The GoS troops stayed in their barracks while seven people were killed.  
When the civilians attempted to seek refuge in the military compound during the attack, 
they were fired on by the GoS army (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 2005). 
 When attacks have occurred, the GoS police have been unwilling or cited being 
unable to investigate the scene.  Even when a beating took place of a citizen by members 
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of the local Arab militia within a few hundred meters of a police station, the police did 
not respond to requests to inspect the scene of the crime (Ibid).   
 The GoS has excused its failure to protect as well as prosecute based on a lack of 
resources such as fuel, areas being unsafe to travel, and orders not to leave their station 
(Ibid).  Lack of political will is mentioned within the UN reports as a source for the GoS 
failure to fulfill its obligations as a state whose duty it is to protect its own citizens.  The 
past two years have witnessed the IC having to fulfill the neglected duties of the GoS 
with a three pronged approach. 
 
3.2 International communitys efforts and impact in Darfur 
 
3.2.1 The international communitys efforts and impact in addressing the Government of 
Sudans violations and neglect of its protection obligations 
  As previously mentioned by Hugo Slim (2002), the operationalization of 
protection by the IC has taken a trident strategy.  Attention has been focused in the areas 
of political action, humanitarian operations, and security missions.  All these activities 
are aimed at supporting civilians caught up in war to address their protection needs.   
According to the UN, these needs fit within a broad range of the POC concept.  The 
spectrum of efforts by the IC varies when addressing the most immediate priorities, 
which are the minimization of causalities, compared to the more long term priorities, 
which are the promotion of a rule of law and order within their state or local community.   
 In line with the POC definition (refer to text 2.2), in the context of Darfur, one can 
logically argue that the most important effort by the IC should be to cease the direct and 
indirect killing of civilians.  The IC has taken on a number of protection efforts within the 
three fields in an attempt to achieve these ends. Humanitarian operations are being 
carried out to assist in the housing and feeding of the displaced population, security is 
being provided in an indirect manner, and political efforts are encompassing social, 
economic, and legal action.  These fields are also trying to promote a more long-term 
solution to the POC problem which includes the volunteer return of the displaced 
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population to their home communities.  The efforts and impacts concerning these three 
fields will be described to underscore the need in proposing the research questions. 
 
3.2.1.1 The efforts of the diplomatic activities by the international community in 
Darfur.  For the past two years the IC, mainly through the regional organization of the 
AU has been pushing for a peace agreement to be reached on the Darfur crisis. The AU 
has brought together the GoS, the SLM and the JEM for a series of peace negotiations in 
the Abuja, Nigeria.  These on-going talks are seen as the means by which lasting peace in 
Darfur can be achieved and the POC situation can begin to be resolved. 
The provisions being discussed in Abuja mirror Barbara Walters credible 
commitment theory (CCT) (2002) which include power sharing measures and third party 
security guarantees.  These conditions are viewed as the necessary formula in achieving a 
lasting peace in the Darfur and eventually propelling the millions of displaced to return 
home.  
CCT is a well researched theory founded on the successful factors which are 
needed for warring parties in an internal conflict to fulfill their commitments to a 
negotiated agreement. Walters (2002:5-6) CCT makes the case that, Only if a third 
party is willing to enforce or verify demobilization, and only if the combatants are willing 
to extend power-sharing guarantees, will promises to abide by the original terms be 
credible and negotiations succeed. CCT is rooted in evidence collected from 72 
negotiations which were conducted to end internal conflicts in the second half of the 20th 
century.  In all these negotiations, only a third resulted in the conclusion of the conflict 
with a successfully implemented peace agreement.  In the cases in which the warring 
parties did implement an agreement, a third party was present to provide security 
guarantees during demobilization, and post-conflict power sharing conditions in the first 
postwar government had been nurtured during the negotiations.  It is from this evidence 
that CCT postulates the need to apply third party security guarantees and power sharing 
devices to all internal conflict negotiations (Ibid).   
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 The application of CCT can be witnessed in the recently negotiated 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS and the SPLM.  In this case, third 
party security guarantees and post-conflict power sharing are the conditions that are 
getting both sides to stick to their agreement (Bischoff, 2005).  This practical application 
of CCT to the negotiated peace agreement between the north and the south might serve as 
a close- to- home example for the conditions that need to be promoted by the IC for 
resolving the conflict in Darfur.  By having a working conflict resolution mechanism in 
place, the destructive byproducts of the conflict such as the lack of protection for the 
civilian population could be better addressed.  
 Regrettably, as of April 2006, despite assurances by Kofi Annan that an agreement 
would be reached by the end of the 2005, the talks in Abuja continue (Secretary-
Generals Monthly Report to the Security Council on Darfur, 2005).  The IC is patiently 
awaiting the outcome of the peace talks in Abuja that are structured around CCT. The 
peace talks are the only known conflict resolution mechanism in reaching a political 
agreement to which all parties will commit so that long-term safety of civilians can be 
insured. 
 Prior to the start of the peace talks in August, 2004, the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue (2006) in Geneva pushed for the first negotiated agreement between the GoS 
and opposition parties under the auspices of Chad and the AU.  The Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement signed in April 2004 was the first diplomatic effort by the IC to set 
stage for the regional, state, and local dialogue among the parties fighting in Darfur.  The 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement within its Political Preamble was, convinced of 
the necessity of the establishment in Darfur of a democratic political culture to guarantee 
to the populations of the region their political, economic and social rights (Joint 
Ceasefire Commission, 2004: 1). 
 In accord with its Political Preamble all the parties involved agreed to give up the 
use of force as a means of settling their differences. It set forth an end of hostilities to 
ensure a fast and unrestricted humanitarian access to the needy populations of 
Darfur (Ibid).  The warring parties were also to refrain from any violence carried out 
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on the civilian population. To monitor these commitments, a Chadian lead, AU-
sponsored Joint Ceasefire Commission was established (Ibid). 
 Based on the ceasefire agreement, the UN and the GoS agreed on a UN sponsored 
Darfur Plan of Action (United Nations, 2004), also known as the Pronk Plan, named after 
the UNs Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sudan, Jan Pronk.  This 
agreement at the strategic level would serve as the blueprint for the massive humanitarian 
operation that was being strengthened in the summer of 2004 to protect the citizens of 
Darfur in absence of a soon to be deployed AU led third party security force. The plan 
called for the creation of safe areas for the displaced people of Darfur with security 
provided by the GoS police and armed forces.  Pockets of security would be established 
around high concentrations of the IDPs to make sure that people could continue to farm 
and move between food and water sources.  All offensive military operations by all 
parties would cease in the proposed safe areas, and the Joint Ceasefire Commission was 
charged with its implementation (Ibid).   
There are other areas besides political agreements that the IC has been attempting 
diplomatically to influence the GoS and warring factions in regards to their violations of 
POC in Darfur.  Economic and legal measures like sanctions and an armed embargo have 
been imposed by states and organizations against the GoS and warring factions.  
However, due to divisions within the IC and its members foreign policies, these efforts 
appear not to carry the weight that will actually get the parties to respect the welfare of 
the citizens of Darfur.   
An article in The Economist (2005b) stresses this particular case in point with the 
worlds super power, the US, having a contradiction within its own foreign policy 
concerning the GoS.  The worlds largest aid donor, USAID gives Sudan billions in 
development aid along with support from the USs Central Intelligent Agency to get the 
GoSs support in the war on terror (Ibid).  However, the US State Department lists Sudan 
as a country which still sponsors terrorism, and the US Congress has maintained trade 
sanctions against the country for a number of years (Ibid).   
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This diplomatic mixed signal sent out by the US typifies the ICs lack of political 
coordination within its wide-reaching ranks.  The divisions within the United Nations 
own Security Council are seen as obstacles to developing a comprehensive IC agenda to 
get the GoS to buy into the notion of a Responsibility to Protect (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2005).     
The Security Council within Resolution 1564 (2004) suggested employing oil 
sanctions against Sudan regarding its failure to protect its civilians.  The oil which has 
been recently discovered is viewed as a main source of the GoSs income to fund military 
operations. Yet, due to the presence of China on the Security Council, observers note that 
this recommendation is unlikely to materialize (Reuters, 2005b). Arguments have been 
made by Nelly Swilla (2004) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that oil 
sanctions would have the unintended consequence of isolating Sudan further by 
strengthening its relationship with China, sending already record high oil prices 
skyrocketing, and prompting members of the Arab League to see this act as a typical 
western anti-Arab plot. 
 
3.2.1.2 The impact of the diplomatic activities by the international community in 
Darfur.  In the two years since the creation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire and the Darfur 
Plan of Action, the influence of these political sponsored efforts can be seen as a not 
impacting the POC situation as much as was hoped for.  Reports from the African Union 
Ceasefire Commission (2006) on alleged violations of the agreements read like a book.  
The list of atrocities details: killings, torture, rapes, robberies and the destruction of entire 
villages by all the parties that were the signatories to the agreements (Ibid). It is rather 
obvious that the impact of the diplomatic efforts have not achieved the ends they were 
designed to accomplish.  The establishment in Darfur of a .democratic political culture 
to guarantee to the populations of the region their political, economic and social rights 
appears to be a far cry from what is happening on the ground (Joint Ceasefire 
Commission, 2004: 1). 
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Further investigation is required into what the IC can do to get the GoS and 
warring factions to adhere to the obligations they have made outlined in the Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement and Darfur Action Plan. There also needs to be suggestions as to 
what diplomatic pressures the IC can apply to conclude the peace talks in Abuja.  Every 
day that passes without an agreement results in the death and displacement of more 
civilians of Darfur and further strain on the ICs humanitarian resources. 
 
3.2.1.3 The efforts of the humanitarian operations by the international community 
in Darfur.  The tremendous undertaking by the IC in its humanitarian efforts in Darfur is 
one of the largest, quickest build-ups of its kind in relief history (International Committee 
for the Red Cross, 2004).  In a period of almost two years, the IC has ramped-up its 
humanitarian mission to over 80 governmental and non-governmental agencies that have 
a combined staff of close to 15,000 (United Mission in Sudan, 2006).  The UN has 
focused a third of its humanitarian budget in attempting to lessen the effects of internal 
conflicts on the civilian population of Sudan and Darfur (United Nations Daily News, 
2005a).  
According to the World Food Program in 2006, two and half million people are to 
receive food assistance from just this one organization alone (World Food Program, 
2005).  This number has been steadily increasing on a monthly basis since the ICs 
involvement (Ibid).  Feeding this many people is quite an impressive feat considering the 
geographical, logistical, and security challenges of the isolated, hostile environment of 
Darfur.  Regardless, it can be evidently seen that if it was not for the presence of the 
humanitarian operations in the region, the death toll would be significantly higher. 
Because of the destruction of their villages, forced displacement, and unforgiving 
geographical location, the lives of millions of civilians receiving aid are critically 
dependent on the ICs combined humanitarian efforts. 
 Based on the UNs Work Plan for Sudan (United Nations, 2005), the IC has 
adopted a protection by presence strategy.  It is believed that the presence of international 
agencies and human rights observers will reduce the attacks on the civilians of Darfur.  
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Within this protection strategy, as noted by the Darfur Plan of Action, the IC has 
established safe areas where the refugee and IDPs camps are located to receive basic 
services, be registered, and re-establish family contacts (United Nations, 2004).   
Humanitarian actors have adopted a Training of Trainers methodology, where 
displaced community leaders, local GoS officials, police, and armed forces are informed 
of their human right obligations and dialogue is facilitated between the civilians and the 
GoS authorities (Ibid; Action by Churches Together, 2005).  These protection efforts are 
a more long-term attempt at getting all parties involved on the ground in Darfur to begin 
the long steps needed in improving relations so that the displaced may be able to return 
home safely and voluntarily.  
 
3.2.1.4 The efforts of security by the international community in Darfur.  In 
continuing with the ICs protection by presence strategy, the security efforts by the IC 
have come to be solely represented by the African Unions Mission in Sudan, known as 
the AMIS.  Guided by the African Union Peace and Security Council (2004) the current 
security force of around 7,500 military, observer and police personnel has been mandated 
to verify whether the GoS and warring factions are fulfilling their obligations as 
previously outlined by the Humanitarian Ceasefire. The protection force that is within the 
AMIS presence was originally tasked just to protect the observers in Darfur (Ibid). The 
AMIS has been recording POC violations on behalf of the IC to document the violence 
that has been conducted against the civilian population (African Union Ceasefire 
Commission, 2006).  They have also posted police personnel to work side by with their 
GoS police counterparts to monitor the situation. 
 
3.2.1.5 Impact of the humanitarian and security efforts.  The humanitarian and 
security of the IC operations incorporating the protection by presence strategy can be 
noted as having an impact on the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR).  This indicator which is 
formulated by the World Health Organization (2005) measures the number of deaths per 
day per 10,000 of affected population.  CMR is the most specific and useful gauge to 
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monitor the most immediate priority of a conflict situation by the number of causalities it 
produces (Sphere Project, 2004).   
As reported in the World Health Organizations Mortality Survey for the Greater 
Darfur Region (2005), during the conflict in spring 2004 before the establishment of the 
camps, the average CMR of Darfur was 2.2 for all ages (with a CMR of 0.3 considered 
normal in Darfur and 1.0 CMR constitutes a crisis situation).  Since the build up of 
humanitarian operations in the summer of 2005 and the establishment of camps within 
safe areas, the CMR has been decreased dramatically to 0.9.  For children under the age 
of five, before the arrival of the IC, the CMR was 5.0.  In 2005 it was brought down to 
2.0 (Ibid). To give these statistics perspective, with the total affected population of Darfur 
at 3.5 million, a CMR of 0.9 (which is 0.6 over the pre-conflict CMR of 0.3) creates an 
additional 6,300 deaths per month as a result of the conflict. 
It is important to keep in mind that the statistics from 2005 taken in southern 
Darfur do not reflect civilians not living in the IC sponsored camps.  This is half the total 
Darfur population. The participants in the mortality study were just those who resided 
within the camps or safe areas (Ibid).  Still based on the statistics from 2005, 
humanitarian operations appear to have cut the deaths in Darfur down to a third of what 
they were before the start of hostilities in the region.  Unfortunately, the CMR is still 
hovering right around the crisis threshold level of 1.0 for all ages. For children under five, 
it is double what is considered to constitute an emergency (Ibid). 
There are critics to the protection by presence strategy like Victoria Wheeler with 
the United Kingdoms Humanitarian Policy Group (2005), who argues that the anecdotal 
evidence suggests its works is by no means an exact science.  She believes that the 
protection by presence might actually increase the risk for civilians in other areas, by 
displacing it or it may encourage post-visit attacks if the presence is not maintained on a 
constant basis (Ibid).  This could be the case since large portions of Darfur have been 
excluded in the World Health Organizations CMR survey. 
Regardless, the efforts of the humanitarian agencies in Darfur are vitally necessary 
for securing the civilians most immediate priorities in terms of their physical well-being.  
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It appears from examining the data concerning the CMR in the region before and after the 
eruption of conflict that the arrival of the humanitarians has improved the situation, yet 
the number of deaths occurring is still too high to be considered acceptable. 
There is also the more long term question of how to establish rule of law within 
the region in order to facilitate an environment for return for millions who have been 
displaced.  The efforts of humanitarians in these areas have been based on an 
implementation matrix developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross which 
focuses on the local level by building capacity (International Council on Voluntary 
Agencies, 2004).     
The more long-term priority for civilian safety within Darfur is promoting an 
environment conducive for the displaced to return home.  Thus far, the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (2005) has noted the 20,000 displaced persons have 
returned home on their own accord.  Regrettably this number is offset by the tens of 
thousands who continue to flee their communities every month (Ibid).  At present, the 
rate of return is nowhere near the rate of the displaced.   
Doubt has been generated as to the protection presence strategy adopted by the IC 
in Darfur.  These political negotiated safe havens for humanitarian efforts to take place 
appear to have had some success in protecting the civilians.  The CMR has been reduced, 
but it still remains too high to consider the population of Darfur safe.  Due to the strategy 
itself, large areas are going unmeasured and it is unclear what the effects of the conflict 
have been in those unmonitored locales. As speculated by others, the violence could have 
migrated to those areas outside the safe zones.  No one knows for sure since it is too 
dangerous for the IC to work in the entire region of Darfur. 
With the short term needs of the ICs humanitarian efforts having mixed results, 
the more long term priorities of returning home by the displaced appear to be worsening.  
With no home or village to return to, the refugees and IDPs are now wards of the IC.  
Their survival is dependent on ICs humanitarian projects in providing basic services.  
With millions displaced, this creates a huge burden on the IC. No long term safety for the 
displaced can occur without their becoming self-sufficient again. Based on the problems 
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the IC is encountering, there is a critical need to explore other avenues to understand 
what more can be done to better assist the IC in both its short and long term humanitarian 
protection ventures. 
 
3.3 Summary 
Chapter three has described the POC violations which have occurred in Darfur and 
the ICs diplomatic, humanitarian, and security activities to curb the violence.  It appears 
when addressing the short term protection priorities of the civilian population, CMR, the 
indicator used to measure casualties, has decreased.  Yet the latest report on CMR still 
has the number of fatalities occurring at the emergency threshold, which is producing 
several thousand additional deaths per month.   
The more long term goals of protecting civilians by facilitating the conditions to 
return are practically non-existent.  The number of returns is just a handful and is offset 
by those who are continuing to flee their homes.  In that regard, it does not appear the IC 
has been able to foster the conditions to get the civilians to leave the camps where basic 
services are provided for by the humanitarians.   
The situation in Darfur remains tense.  The civilian population is still at great risk.  
When the state is not doing its fundamental job of protecting its citizens, the ICs limited 
experience in tackling such a big problem in an isolated, landlocked region is a 
challenging undertaking.  More investigation is needed into the specific problems the IC 
is facing and what can be done to address these problems and lessen the harmful effects 
on Darfurs non-combatants.  The next chapter presents the research design and 
methodology used to guide the research in an attempt to answer the research questions 
and examine the hypotheses. 
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4.0 Research Design and Methodology 
 
The general issue which has appeared to have arisen since the ICs involvement in 
Darfur is a gap between the rhetoric of the IC with its Responsibility to Protect (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2005) and the ICs ability to actually provide for the safety of 
the people of Darfur.  In spite of the ICs efforts, violations by the warring parties against 
civilians continue to transpire. The IC is being criticized even though the statistics reveal 
that the immediate needs of the population are somewhat being met. Based on the 
evidence provided in chapter three, if it were not for the ICs presence, the destructive 
toll on the local population would probably be much worse.  The CMR has decreased, but 
the protection presence strategy does not permit for all of Darfur to be taken into account. 
There are still an unacceptable number of deaths occurring as a result of the conflict.  The 
complex conflict landscape of Darfur makes it difficult to grasp the ICs achievements 
concerning POCs most pressing concerns.  
With regard to the long term focus of the ICs efforts in fostering an environment 
of return, there is little evidence to suggest its effectiveness. After a presence of almost 
two years, the IC has not been able to get the population to begin the journey back to 
their home communities, and the numbers of the displaced are only increasing.  A cloud 
of doubt hangs over the mix results of the IC political, humanitarian and security efforts 
in Darfur.  
 
4.1 Outline of research question and hypothesis 
This study was conducted to tap the knowledge of selected professionals with 
hands-on experience in Darfur. They were interviewed concerning their views on the 
problems that the IC is encountering in its protection activities along with possible 
solutions to these issues.  The interviewees insights were divided into two parts based on 
the wide range of protection needs of the population in the POC definition (refer to text 
2.2).  These two parts are the most immediate protection priorities and the more long 
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term protection priorities of the civilian population. Therefore the four research questions 
chosen in this study to shed light on the situation concerning POC in Darfur are: 
A) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the international community 
has encountered in addressing the most immediate protection priorities of the civilians of 
Darfur?  
 
B) According to the professionals, what can be done to address these problems in order 
to more effectively impact the immediate protection priorities of the civilians of Darfur? 
 
C) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the international community 
has encountered in addressing the more long term protection priorities of the civilians of 
Darfur? 
 
D) According to the professionals, what can be done to address these problems in order 
to more effectively impact the long term protection priorities of the civilians of Darfur?  
 
The first two questions, A and B deal with the more immediate protection 
priorities of the civilian population. With the recent securitization of human rights and the 
constantly changing nature of the conflict, the most immediate protection needs of 
civilians are explored without the guidance of theory or hypothesis. The variables for 
research questions A and B are consequently based on findings in the data.   
  Research questions C and D pertain to the more long term protection priorities of 
the Darfur population.  The hypothesis for question C is: The lack of commitment by the 
warring parties to their negotiated agreements is viewed as one of the main sources of the 
lack of civilian protection.  
The hypothesis for research question D is: The most effective means to address the 
lack of commitment by the warring parties is negotiating a political settlement which 
includes political power sharing, wealth sharing and third party security guarantees.  
These provisions as outlined in Walters credible commitment theory are being discussed 
in Abuja stand the best chance of getting a lasting peace in the region which might 
improve the long term protection prospects for the local Darfur population. 
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4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Choice of methodological approach 
The methodology for this study is grounded in the qualitative tradition.  The 
qualitative approach was chosen over the quantitative one due to three factors concerning 
the protection of civilian field in Darfur.  The first is that the recent securitization of POC 
by the IC means that the field itself has had little time to be explored.  Repstad (1993) has 
confirmed that the utilization of qualitative methods is widely used to cast light on 
subjects that have not been widely researched.  As noted by Rubin and Rubin (1995) 
along with the on-going nature of the unfolding POC situation in Darfur, a qualitative 
approach is most helpful in keeping tabs on a situation that is transpiring on a daily basis. 
The third factor is that a qualitative approach is more suitable than quantitative research 
to describe issues in detail (Ibid).  The topic of POC in Darfur is one that is best 
expressed with narratives and rich examples to which qualitative interviewing lends itself 
well.  These three conditions highlight the qualitative method as the best choice in 
guiding the data collection for the research.   
 
4.2.2 Choice of methodological technique 
In order to capture the knowledge of the research subjects, the study employed 
semi-structured interviews as the methodological technique.  According to Kvale (1997), 
semi-structured interviews are best used when the goal of the research is to draw upon the 
personal experiences of the interviewees in order to describe a concept within a specific 
context.  Semi-structured interviewing permits a certain level of freedom in the 
sequencing of questions by the way in which questions are posed and how much time and 
attention one chooses to spend on the different themes that emerge during the interview.  
In addition, semi-structured interviews allow for the opportunity to add questions that due 
to the exploratory nature of the subject were not able to be foreseen (Dallard, 2000).   
This is opposed to questionnaires and surveys where everything is set from the beginning 
and do not permit any investigation into previously unknown areas of interest.  If the 
study had developed a questionnaire with a set of rigid questions, this probably would not 
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have covered the entire POC field, and pertinent information may not have been 
discovered.  
 The flexible nature of the semi-structure interview also allowed for interviewing 
several different lines of work that are involved with POC.  Whether it was talking to 
military security personnel, diplomats, or humanitarian aid workers, the interview was 
able to be held within a set design which did not interrupt the flow of the conversation 
due to terminology or issues that did not apply within that particular interviewees area of 
expertise.   
 The semi-structure qualitative interview was the best methodological approach in 
such a broad, unexplored field that is evolving on a daily basis.  Its ability to adapt to any 
number of interviewee circumstances resulted in a format which was able to extract 
useful and colorful information on the POC situation in Darfur.     
 
4.2.3 Selection 
The interviewees were chosen based on a criterion outlined by Rubin and Rubin 
(1995) which states three requirements for selection with qualitative interviewing: (1) the 
interviewees have knowledge about what is being studied; (2) they have a willingness to 
talk; and (3) they should represent a wide range of points of view.   
Based on Slims (2002) operationalization of POC, practitioners from the fields of 
diplomacy, humanitarian operations, and military operations were chosen to provide the 
data on the ICs protection efforts for civilians in the context of Darfur.  The interviewees 
needed to have had first hand knowledge of the ICs protection efforts in Darfur.  
 A form email was sent to individuals within specific organizations who were 
known to have an involvement in Darfur based on their publicized activities.   The form 
email stated who was conducting the research, the affiliation of the researcher, the 
research questions and the name of the advisor for the research and organization 
overseeing the study.  Due to the sensitive nature of organizations and individuals 
working with the GoS, if requested, a condition of confidentiality was provided so as to 
not interrupt their protection work being carried out in Darfur.  It was also hoped that 
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confidentiality would permit the interviewees to speak more openly on their POC 
experiences. 
   In some cases, the email was forwarded to other individuals through whom the 
initial contact thought would be more appropriate to be a part of the research.  Most 
interviewees requested that they would like to see the interview questions before 
committing to be interviewed.    
Ten people were interviewed from the diplomatic, humanitarian, military security 
fields from more than 60 who had been contacted. Due to the cross-disciplinary nature of 
some interviewees professions, such as the heads of the UNs and AUs missions in 
Sudan, these individuals would be considered experts in more than one field.  This wide 
selection of interviewees was necessary in trying to address the ICs multi-faceted 
involvement of so many actors operating at various levels in Darfur in the attempt to 
protect its citizens.  
A brief description of each interviewee is provided below to give background on 
his or her experiences concerning POC in Darfur.  This highlights their credibility so that 
the information they provide in the results chapter is established coming from a source 
familiar with the protection issues facing the IC in Darfur.  
 
Interviewee Number 1:  Jan Pronk is at the head of the global level for the IC concerning 
the protection efforts for the entire state of Sudan. Pronk is the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General of the UN in Sudan and runs the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS).  This organization oversees all the UN based humanitarian operations in the 
country.  Pronk is a former Dutch politician and professor who has been a key figure in 
the diplomacy and security arenas in Sudan since he took his current post in 2004.  He is 
responsible for a mandate of 10,000 troops and police in the south of the country.  Pronk 
has negotiated the Darfur Action Plan which set the stage for the arrival of African Union 
in Darfur and other political initiatives in Sudan.  His work for the UN gives him a broad 
overview of the strategy employed for the POC crisis in Darfur.  Pronk would qualify as 
an authority in all three POC operationalizations. 
 
Interviewee Number 2:  At the regional level is Ambassador Baba Gana Kingabe who is 
the Special Representative of the AU in Sudan.  Kingabe is a career Nigerian diplomat 
who is the head of the ICs security efforts concerning Darfur in Sudan. At the strategic 
level, Ambassador Kingabe oversees a mandate for 7,000 military and police who 
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comprise the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is the only security 
presence of the IC in Darfur.  Kingabe has been special envoy for the AU with its 
diplomatic efforts at the north-south negotiations from Machakos to Naivasha, the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement for Darfur in 2004, and the current peace talks in 
Abuja. 
 
Interviewee Number 3:  Endre Stiansen is a Norwegian academic who is coordinating a 
team of resource people assisting the AU secretariat in negotiating the wealth sharing 
component in the peace talks in Abuja.  Stiansen is an advisor with hands-on experience 
with the inter-workings of the ICs current efforts to solve the Darfur conflict with a 
peace agreement that attempts to address some of the root causes of the conflict. 
 
Interviewee Number 4:  Andrew Marshall is an American who is the director of the 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue based in Geneva, Switzerland.  This organization was 
the first non-governmental organization to discuss with the GoS the opening of 
humanitarian access for the people of Darfur.  This NGO began the political process of 
negotiating the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in 2004 between the rebel movements 
and the GoS.  The legwork of this organization paved the way for the eventual 
involvement of the IC in Darfur.  Their work was the first in bringing the opposition 
parties, the JEM and the SLM to the negotiation table with the IC over humanitarian 
issues, as well as informing these groups of their humanitarian obligations as dictated by 
law. The diplomatic efforts of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is a postmodern 
example of a non-state organization facilitating negotiations that have been typically 
reserved for states or state sponsored organizations like the UN or AU.  
  
Interviewee Number 5:  Halle Jørn Hansen is a Norwegian humanitarian, journalist, and 
political advisor to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south. He 
has lived on and off in Africa for 40 years. Hansen has been secretary general for 
Norwegian Peoples Aid and has intimate knowledge of the ICs political and 
humanitarian efforts regarding Sudan as a whole. 
 
Interviewee Number 6:  Eric Reeves is an American humanitarian who initially worked 
for Doctors without Borders in Darfur. He is a research analyst who has been called on 
by the United States Congress to testify as an expert on the security aspects of the POC 
crisis in Darfur. Reeves was one of the first individuals to bring the ICs attention to the 
violence occurring in Darfur.  He was the first to publicly call what was happening in 
Darfur genocide. 
 
Interviewee Number 7: Asking to be anonymous and will be referred to as Security #1, is 
a South African male who has been a major within the AMIS security force in Darfur for 
a period of seven months. Security #1 is a trained military observer whose responsibility 
is coordinating confidence building patrols, road security patrols, search and rescue 
missions, and Armored Personnel Carrier training courses.  With the changing role of the 
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AMIS, Security #1 took on more duties centered on protection.  His experiences at the 
tactical level gave him a first hand perspective of the day to day security activities of the 
AU.   
 
Interviewee Number 8: Asking to be anonymous, Humanitarian #1 is a Norwegian male 
who has been managing an IDP camp in Darfur for the past year.  Humanitarian #1 has 
previously worked in the south of Sudan as a field coordinator. Humanitarian #1 is a 
practitioner of the protection by presence strategy.   
 
Interviewee Number 9:  Asking to be anonymous, Humanitarian #2 is an American 
female who has worked as a protection officer in several postings around the world. Her 
most recent posting was working within two IDP camps in Darfur over a nine month 
period. Humanitarian #2 primary responsibilities were concerning women and gender 
based violence. She also worked in conjunction with the AMIS, which was tasked with 
providing protection in the camps.  
 
Interviewee Number 10:  Asking to be anonymous, Humanitarian #3 is a Norwegian 
female who is program coordinator for a large NGO working in Darfur.  Humanitarian #3 
has worked in Africa and Asia since the mid-1980s in various emergency operations.  
Her work in Darfur has focused on assisting small IDP camps in Darfur and building 
capacity by training officials within the GoSs humanitarian aid agency, Humanitarian 
Aid Commission on the principles of human rights to which the GoS has made itself a 
party. 
 
Based on this list of interviewees, the IC is represented at the global level by 
Pronk, the regional level by Kingabe and Stiansen and the agency levels by the rest of the 
interviewees regarding their protection efforts. These protection activities are also 
depicted at the strategic and tactical levels as well when it comes to their 
operationalization.  This broad sampling of informants is aimed at getting an overall input 
from the diplomatic, humanitarian, and security communities tasked to protect the lives 
and welfare of the Darfur population.    
 
4.2.4 Interview guide 
The basis for the interviews was centered on an interview guide (see Appendix A).  
The interview guide was designed to ask open-ended questions in an attempt to solicit 
broad responses instead of just a simple yes or no.  The interviewing was semi-structured. 
This technique was chosen for its flexible and continuous design.  
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 Before the start of the interview, as a part of the interview guide, a list of 
definitions were provided to make sure that there would be no confusion concerning the 
general terms employed through the interview.  The international community was 
defined, as well as the protection of civilians. The definition used for POC expressed the 
division of the range of protection priorities of the civilian population utilized in the 
research questions.   
The interviewees were informed that they could ask for further clarification on any 
terms or topics of which they were unsure.  The interviewees were also told that they 
could stop the interview at anytime. If requested, the confidentiality of the person and the 
organization would be provided, and all data collected for the study would be erased after 
its completion.  It also affirmed that a copy of transcript for review by the interviewee 
could be provided, if requested, as well as copy of the paper.  These measures were taken 
in an attempt to get the interviewee to speak as freely as possible regarding their views on 
the ICs protection efforts. 
 The researcher began the interview by getting the interviewees general 
background in regard to the protection of civilians to establish their credibility in the field 
or fields in which they had experience.  Then the interview proceeded ask the interviewee 
to describe their POC work in Darfur.  The interview sought to get feedback on their 
views regarding the problems that the IC was experiencing with its protection efforts in 
Darfur.  These problems were divided into two categories based on the POC definition.  
The first category was the civilians most immediate needs, such as physical safety.  The 
second was on the more long-term priorities such as the conditions needed to return 
home.  This division was employed to cover the wide gamut of protection requirements 
within the POC concept. During this line of questioning, the interviewee would provide 
feedback and opinion on the impact the IC had, the root causes of the conflict and the 
challenges encountered by the IC or their particular field.    
 Based on their responses, the interview sough to solicit what could be done to 
address the problems that the IC was experiencing to better its protection activities 
regarding the field or fields in which the interviewee worked. This again was divided 
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between the more pressing needs of the civilian population and the more long range ones. 
In regard to the more long term priorities, all interviewees were asked to comment on the 
hypothesis for research question D based on Walters CCT.  This was posed as a question 
as to how they foresaw the application of the power sharing, wealth sharing and third 
party security arrangements discussed in Abuja as being the crucial device to protecting 
civilians by resolving the conflict in Darfur.   
Since the talks in Abuja are the only known diplomatic efforts being pursued to 
end the conflict, this conflict resolution mechanism appears to be vital to the long-term 
protection concerns of Darfurs civilians. In addition to this theoretically based 
hypothesis, the interviewees were asked to comment on what direction they felt their field 
or fields were headed with respect to civilian protection.  Finally, all interviewees at the 
end of the interview were given the opportunity to add anything to what was discussed 
during the interview.  Probing questions were asked if the interview brought up certain 
topics which were deemed important to investigate in more detail.  These questions 
usually dealt with an interviewees specific role or duties within their organization.  
Clarification was also sometimes needed to understand contexts or situations that had not 
been mentioned in the literature.  The flexible nature of the interview guide, while 
providing some essential structure to the interview, also unearthed common themes upon 
which the literature had failed to touch. 
 
4.2.5 Data Collection 
The interviews lasted about 30 minutes to an hour in length, with the average 
interview taking about 40 minutes. Six interviews were conducted either in person in 
Oslo, Norway or Khartoum, Sudan.  With some of the interviewees living in other parts 
of the world, four interviews had to be done by telephone. The interviews were 
administrated over a two month period, between mid-January to mid-March 2006. All 
conversations were taped recorded onto a portable mini-disc recorder with a microphone.  
The interviews were then transcribed from audio recordings to maintain accuracy and 
transparency, as well as for the purposes of coding. Two interviewees asked for 
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transcripts of the interview and only one made changes to the transcript itself.  Four of 
the interviewees requested to remain anonymous.  
 
4.2.6 Data analysis 
The collected data was analyzed based on a phenomenological method for 
meaningful gathering (Giorgi and Giorgi, 2003).  This method is based on concentrating 
the expressed meanings in a way to find their basic significance.  This empirical analysis 
has four steps: (1) overview impression; (2) discrimination of meaningful units or 
variables; (3) transformation; and (4) synthesis of the transformed meaningful units into a 
concentrate of the meaningful content.   
 The overview of the data was obtained by transcribing all the interviews word for 
word and reading through them several times before an analysis was carried out. 
Afterwards, all the utterings were numbered, separated and arranged into meaningful 
units that were judged for their value pertaining to the research questions. In the analysis 
transformation step, all the quotes were transformed into descriptive units and grouped 
into variables.  These groupings were based on a codebook (see Appendix B) that was 
developed.  The information from all the interviews were compared with all the variables 
collected and a synthesis of the concentrated meaningful content was prepared for the 
data to be presented in the results chapter.  The meaningful units or variables found in the 
data were used to answer the research questions. 
   
4.2.7 Methodological considerations 
The strength in qualitative methodology lays in the possibility to explore an 
individuals experience of a phenomenon and then draw conclusions from this. There are, 
however, still methodological shortcomings in the use of qualitative methods.  Validity, 
generalization, reliability and objectivity are often discussed in quantitative research as 
the antennas for the datas scientific value (Robson, 1993).  In qualitative research these 
terms should be replaced by credibility, transferability, dependability, conformability 
(Ibid).   
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4.2.7.1 Credibility. Credibility refers to whether the studied phenomenon was 
described and presented in an accurate way (Ibid).  According to Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), credibility can be increased by triangulation.  This means that the phenomenon is 
studied from different angles to paint the most representative picture.  As previously 
stated, people with hands-on experience concerning civilian protection in Sudan were 
interviewed.  It was important to interview from different fields (security, humanitarian, 
and diplomatic) to shed light on the various components of the POC activities by the 
international community.  This permitted many different points of view represented in the 
data.  The application of semi-structured interviews as a means by which to accurately 
gather the data allowed for the investigation of new variables as they emerged. 
 
4.2.7.2 Transferability.  Transferability refers to the datas ability to be 
generalized in respect to other contexts.  Generalization is usually not the goal with 
qualitative research (Robson, 1993).  Yet it is still possible to generalize in a qualitative 
study by describing in detail what has been done by specifying the theoretical framework 
the study is based on.  Lincoln and Guba (1985) believe that qualitative research can only 
offer working hypotheses with a description of the time, date, and context from which the 
information was gathered for.   The authors explain, 
 It is not the researchers responsibility to make an index for which the context of 
the data can be transferred to. It is the researchers duty to present the background 
for the data in a way that decisions about possible transference can be made by 
others who want to use their findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 316).  
 
 In this study it is presented when, where and how the interviews were conducted.  
The majority of the interviewees permitted the usage of their names and organizations 
affiliation.  Both the interview guide and the codebook, which is the analysis for the 
study, are available in the appendix so that others can judge the transferability of the data 
to other situations. 
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4.2.7.3 Dependability.  Dependability refers to whether the data is repeatable and 
is necessary for the study to be valid.  Therefore there is no credibility without 
dependability and the suggested methods to judge these two criteria are similar.  Lincoln 
and Guba understood that if one has demonstrated credibility, one does not need to prove 
the studys dependability (Ibid).  In qualitative research this can be done with a judgment 
of whether the practical gathering of the data is described in such detail that the 
procedures can be followed by someone else.  With interviews it is important to be aware 
of how the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee has the potential of 
influencing the outcome of the interview (Kvale, 1997).  The dependability has been 
insured with the development of the interview guide.  The interview guide was written 
with the purpose of covering all the main topics to make sure enough information about 
the research questions was gathered. 
 
4.2.7.4 Conformability.  Conformability deals with the objectivity of the 
researcher.  It is significant that the researcher has not read the material selectively and 
can give the grounds for the categories that were selected (Fog, 1994).  This is to make 
sure the presented findings come from the original data.  The quotes are in the text to 
demonstrate the connection between the transcriptions and their interpretations by the 
researcher. 
  
By discussing the credibility, transferability, dependability, conformability of the 
study it can be reasonably assumed that the data has been collected in a scientific manner.  
The criteria presented give transparency to the approach in which the results were 
obtained. 
 
4.2.8 Ethical considerations 
The on-going POC situation in Darfur is a sensitive topic for individuals and 
organizations working within the region.  In order to operate in a conflict area where 
there are open hostilities between two sides, organizations have to be perceived as being 
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neutral (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004).  This can be reflected by the fact 
that some of the interviewees requested to remain anonymous for fear of having 
themselves or their organizations barred from Sudan by its government. The only 
association that they will receive will be the field that they have worked in concerning 
Sudan and a number.   
The ability for some of the interviewees to remain confidential enabled the study 
to gather data from such a diverse pool of applicants.  If the identity of the persons and 
organizations were revealed, it would have been much more difficult to get their consent 
to be interviewed in the first place, as well as to provide candid answers in the interview.   
 
4.3 Summary 
 Chapter four has provided the structure of the research design demonstrating the 
need in asking the research questions as well as the hypotheses guiding part of the data 
collection.  The methodology has been described in detail, showing how the data was 
gathered and providing explanation for why the qualitative approach was chosen.  The 
following section will describe and discuss the results which were gathered in answering 
the research questions. 
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5.0 Results 
 
 
In the interviews there was unanimous acknowledgement that there are problems 
with the POC efforts in Darfur.  A common theme which was repeated in all the 
interviews was that the ICs efforts have had many inadequacies.  However, another 
universal pattern emerged within the interviewees as accentuated by Hansen referring to 
POC in Darfur, For all the shortcomings between the UN and AU they make a big 
difference between a terrible situation and an absolute catastrophe (Hansen, 2006 
[Interview]).   
This statement is re-enforced by the statistics provided in chapter three on the 
decrease in fatalities which has occurred among the population since the ICs expanded 
involvement from the summer of 2004.  All those interviewed do recognize the positive 
impact the IC has had on the lives of the non-combatants in Darfur.  This fact must be 
stressed due to the enormous amount of lives, time, and resources that have been devoted 
by the IC in alleviating the suffering of the Darfur people. Without such an effort, many 
more would probably have been killed and displaced.  However, there is room for 
improvement with the ICs activities, given the overwhelming number of casualties and 
displaced persons.  
 
5.1 Research Question A) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the 
international community has encountered in addressing the most immediate protection 
priorities of the civilians of Darfur? 
  
Based on the data there are three areas that the IC has experienced problems in its 
ability in addressing the most immediate protection needs of the civilian population.  This 
list includes: (1) the ICs approach to its handling of third party security; (2) the 
protection by presence strategy that has been adopted by the humanitarian community; 
and (3) the GoSs obstacles created for the IC. These three subsections capture the 
problems that the IC has been facing according to the interviewees and are presented in 
detail. 
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5.1.1 International communitys approach in providing third party security 
The approach the IC has taken regarding its protection strategy in Darfur, led by 
the AU, has been faulted by all the interviewees as being initially too weak in addressing 
the civilian protection needs.  There is a difference in opinion as to why this is the case.  
However, all would agree the end result has been misleading for the ICs third party 
security efforts.  As a consequence, six factors have been cited by most of the 
interviewees as being problematic with the ICs security operation in Darfur: strategy, 
manpower, mandate, logistics, expertise, and the relationship between the AU and the 
UN. All these factors are tightly interrelated in the ICs security efforts to protect. 
   
5.1.1.1 Strategy.   The security strategy by which the IC based its entry into Darfur 
has been mentioned as being a problem with respect to the ICs handling of POC. Among 
the interviewees there is a range of opinions on this matter.  One reason which is held by 
the AU is that the context under which the AU entered into Darfur was expected to be 
completely different than the reality it became.  Kingabe notes the initial strategy under 
which the AMIS was created was a non-interventionist, Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement monitoring mode (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). From Kingabes point of 
view this was the result of the AMIS as well as the IC as being too faithfully in 
implementing the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (Ibid).  The AU was not originally 
tasked with protection, but solely with monitoring the negotiated agreement to which it 
assumed the warring parties would adhere.  The ICs hands were tied concerning its first 
security efforts as spearheaded by the AU when the negotiating parties in Darfur clearly 
violated their negotiated settlement.  As remarked by Kingabe, We realized that we were 
too few, too thinly spread and poorly equipped to take on the additional mandate to 
protect when it became obvious that human rights violations were occurring despite the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in place (Ibid).  This means that circumstances in 
which the AU entered Darfur had changed, and, as a result, the strategy which was first 
employed made it difficult to cope with the immediate protection needs of the population.    
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Reeves and Marshall, on the other hand, lay blame on the way in which the POC 
strategy had been developed by the IC.  Reeves understands it as: 
The issue of the protection of civilians being conceived in an ass backwards way.  
Instead of asking, what are the security requirements on the ground giving the 
prevailing conditions; we have taken the form to date of what is the capacity of the 
AU for protection of civilians? (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone interview]). 
 
In his opinion, Marshall views it as, A face saving way that no one comes out 
looking silly, like the AU (Marshall, 2006 [Telephone interview]). The AU was not 
prepared to take on POC in Darfur and was not successful in Darfur, and the 
international community should take a great deal of blame for that (Ibid).  Both these 
statements neglect to take into account that the underlying reason behind the ICs initial 
involvement in Darfur was based on a negotiated agreement.  As pointed out by the 
leader of the AMIS, the AU was there to initially monitor, not to protect (Kingabe, 2006 
[Interview]).  This created the context out of which much criticism would be directed at 
AMIS on its handling of POC in Darfur.  The next four variables to follow were 
originally rooted in the belief that the missions strategy would be a peacekeeping 
operation based on a negotiated ceasefire agreement. 
 
5.1.1.2 Manpower.  Even though the AMIS as of spring 2006 has ramped up to a 
force of 6,500 of an authorized 7,171 from its initial involvement of 360 personnel, this 
size is perceived as not being large enough. All the interviewees cite the AU force as still 
being too few to effectively protect civilians. Pronk notes, ...they [AMIS] are too small 
(Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). He continues by highlighting protection, only works if you 
are present, if you are present strongly (Ibid). This variable has been faulted by every 
interviewee as impeding the AUs efforts to provide security in Darfur.  This means that 
the troop capacity by the ICs security activities can be associated with their ability to 
impact the civilians physical protection.     
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5.1.1.3 Mandate.   The mandate under which the security component of the AU 
operates has been cited as a variable hindering the ICs protection efforts. This Chapter 
VI mandate provides for the pacific settlement of disputes which the parties involved 
have consented to support (United Nations, 1945).  Stiansen notes that, You have the 
AU force, limited mandate, and bad mandate for political reasons [] Its very difficult 
for the AMIS to go out to provide for the protection of civilians (Stiansen, 2006 
[Interview]). Security #1 says that the Chapter VI mandate for the AMIS peace support 
operation needs to be addressed (Security #1, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  In line with 
the troop capacity of the AU force, the mandate under which it operates receives the same 
condemnation as a problem for the IC.  However, also noted by Security #1, the current 
mandate for the AMIS does permit for the Rules of Engagement to protect civilians if 
their lives have been threatened (Ibid).  But this is only if their lives are in immediate 
danger.  There is an uncertainty as to how this has been interpreted on the ground by the 
AMIS when it comes across POC violations.  Thus far, there has been a limit in practice 
by the AMIS to actively engage the warring parties that they encounter violating POC 
based on its mandate. 
Kingabe underscores that the protection by the AU has to be within its means and 
within its vicinity given the additional mandate of protection for the civilians of Darfur.  
He says:  
Obviously if violations of human rights were going on within our vicinity, of 
course we wouldnt fold our arms, but obviously we wouldnt intervene in a 
situation where 200 well-equipped Janjaweed were attacking an IDP camp. We 
wouldnt intervene with ten people to protect. So it is within vicinity and within 
means that was the mandate we had added in October, 2004.  So within those 
limitations we have done our best (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).   
 
This illustrates that the limited mandate to protect by the AMIS has also limited 
the means by which to provide that protection even if it is called for. As with capacity, 
the mandate created under the initial strategy to protect has been inadequate in addressing 
the needs of the population. 
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5.1.1.4 Logistics.  According to the majority of the interviewees, the AMIS is 
facing problems associated with a lack of logistical support. As pointed out by Reeves, 
the AMIS has not the ability to deal with protection in Darfur. He says in referring to the 
AMIS as having, No capacity for intelligent administration, communications, or 
transportation (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone interview]). Kingabe shares this view that there 
is a need for a much better equipped force to provide protection in Darfur (Kingabe, 2006 
[Interview]).  Stiansen articulates, And of course, the AU doesnt have much [] The 
AU force, the hardware isnt that good (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). This lightly armed 
military presence in Darfur, whose main duty was to monitor not protect, has greatly 
impeded the AUs efforts.   
Even concerning basic necessities like transportation in terms of vehicles and 
helicopters, for example, the AMIS has been desperately coming up short.  Humanitarian 
#2 provides an observation of when the lack of logistical support was a serious problem:  
We had 30 AMIS police assigned to the camp and they had one car. It didnt help 
if we had 400 in the camp.  If they only had one car, they would only be in one 
place.  And in a camp that is 17 km wide with 167,000 people that is not very 
helpful (Humanitarian #2, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  
 
This story provides a glimpse into some of the many logistically issues 
encountered by the security efforts of the AU.  It also exemplifies the strong link between 
logistics and carrying out proactive protection duties such as a patrolling or just showing 
a presence in the community to prevent attacks from occurring. These activities have 
been demonstrated to have been carried out without the proper mandate or manpower, yet 
lacking the adequate transportation, for example, such undertakings become even more 
limited.      
      
5.1.1.5 Expertise.   The humanitarians mention an issue when working with the 
AMIS security personnel is a deficiency in expertise.   Humanitarian #1, who was head of 
a large IDP camp, describes the relationship with the AMIS working within the camp as: 
challenging and difficult, from the perspective of the humanitarian organization 
to find ways to get the AMIS to address issues in the proper way.  It is difficult for 
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them when to intervene and if they do intervene it is difficult for them to do it in a 
sensitivity way, but that is a matter of training (Humanitarian #1, 2006 
[Interview]).  
 
Humanitarian #2 provides a little more color, They had no sensitivity training at all.  We 
were thrilled at the prospect of getting [AMIS] female protection officers until they 
showed up in short sleeves and miniskirts (Humanitarian #2, 2006 [Interview]). In the 
modestly dressed Islamic region of Darfur this is quite a shock to the local culture and is 
a situation in which trained personnel might not place themselves in.     
Humanitarian #2 also describes the AMIS component she was working with as not 
having a clue as to the origins of the conflict.  There was an assumption by the AMIS that 
the conflict was all about religion in Darfur (Ibid).  Humanitarian #2 witnessed 
unprofessional behavior by AMIS personnel.   She said this was characterized as: 
very anti-Muslim, even anti-African in a very funny race sort of way. If they 
were blacker, than the [AMIS] officer, they wouldnt shake hands; they wouldnt 
touch them at all.  They didnt believe the women if they said they had been raped. 
The AMIS became a problem for me as a protection officer [] they lack police 
training, they werent very professional police (Ibid).   
 
The training issue has placed strains on the relationship between the humanitarians 
and the AMIS in their protection duties. Differences in culture and awareness of the 
context of the conflict in Darfur have made lack of expertise an issue in the protection 
work carried out.   
 
5.1.1.6 Relationship between AU and UN.  In regards to POC, there does appear to 
be a communication problem between the two levels represented by the UN and AU. 
This clash is seen in the security arena where despite an existing partnership, the UN 
points to the problems the AUs efforts have had protecting civilians.  Pronk lays some of 
the blame concerning POC in Darfur on the AU, Because the AU so far has not given a 
major priority to security (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). 
  Hansen sees the problem as a breakdown in the talking process between the AU 
and UN (Hansen, 2006 [Interview]). Stiansen notes that the antagonistic relationship 
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between the UN and the AU has created a cleavage between the two organizations 
(Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).  Deflecting the blame, Kingabe does not believe that the AU 
is acting alone in Darfur and as a result it can not be faulted entirely for its shortcoming.  
Kingabe says:  
The international community, bless them, they were very helpful, the entire 
operation was conceived as a partnership between the African Union, which gave 
it the direction, the command and control and the manpower, but the resources, 
financial, material and otherwise were provided by the international community, 
so it was a joint venture for which we can not claim sole responsibility, success or 
failure (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). 
  
 Kingabe notes the mutual partnership which the AU has in conducting security 
activities in Darfur (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). The AU has provided the manpower, but 
not the resource support.  Both are variables which have been generated in the data as to 
problems with the approach taken to security. This suggests that a solution might lie with 
a continued joint approach to POC in addressing these issues. 
 
 In summation, according to the interviewees, the third party security issues the IC 
is facing in minimizing civilian causalities include: (1) strategy; (2) manpower; (3) 
mandate; (4) logistics; (5) expertise; and (6) UN and AU relationship. These are areas 
which the interviewees have identified as problematic. 
 
5.1.2 Humanitarian protection by presence strategy  
A protection by presence strategy has been adopted by the humanitarians in their 
work in the camps in conjunction with the AMIS to provide for the physical safety of the 
displaced.  According to the interviewees, this strategy is deficient. Most of the 
humanitarians note that the camps are viewed by the displaced as the safest place they 
can be, but there are many lapses with the overall security in the camps.  Humanitarian #1 
remarks that:   
 [the] goal in starting the [camp] project there is to have a presence, to have a 
protection by presence strategy. However, I dont think it works very well.  When 
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a situation gets critical, the humanitarian workers have to leave the area as well 
and that is when the population is most vulnerable, when the protection is most 
needed (Humanitarian #1, 2006 [Interview]).  
    
Humanitarian #2 mentions that the humanitarians have had to leave the camps at 
night due to security concerns by the GoS officials, and the nighttime hours are when the 
majority of acts of violence occur.  She says, 
Civilians had to leave the camp before dark for security reasons. We were not 
allowed to stay in the camps after dark and so a lot of what went on in the camp 
went on after dark [] Within a half hour of the internationals leaving, the camp 
they [GoS officials] would routinely start shooting in the air. It was just an 
intimidation tactic; they did it because they could (Humanitarian #2, 2006 
[Telephone interview]).  
 
Humanitarian #2 would get reports on these occurrences from the Sudanese 
national staff who were refugees in the camps and had cell phones to make calls to their 
western counterparts on the outside (Ibid).  It is when the IC isnt present that people 
would disappear, crimes were committed and acts of gender based violence were carried 
out. 
 The civilian police of the AMIS are supposed to reside in the camps, but this is 
not the case in one of the larger camps.  Humanitarian #2 observes the AU police are not 
present at night, just the GoS police, who are supposed to be monitored by the AMIS 
(Ibid).  The AMIS is not vigilant in looking after the GoS police, who are viewed by the 
local population as committing some of the atrocities (Ibid). Even under the umbrella of 
the ICs relief efforts, there has been a breakdown in the protection strategy within the 
IDP camps.   
 
5.1.3 Government of Sudans obstacles encountered by the international community 
  The ICs security presence and humanitarian activities to protect civilians most 
primary physical needs have been impeded by the GoS. The interviewees gave examples 
of showing how the warring parties are perceived as hindering the ICs security and 
humanitarian efforts. The difficulties which the IC has encountered run a wide range of 
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issues as brought forth by the data. The problems mentioned by the interviewees are a 
lack of control by the GoS and the blocking of ICs tactical protection efforts by the 
warring factions.   These variables make the task of POC harder for the IC and are cited 
as having a negative impact on the most immediate protection needs of the Darfur 
population. 
 
5.1.3.1 Lack of control.  The GoSs continued support of the Arab militia groups 
like the Janjaweed that the GoS uses to wage its proxy war in Darfur is viewed as a 
variable which hampers the ICs ability to protect. The GoS has made promises to the IC 
for the past year and a half to disarm the militias.   However, as underscored by Pronk, 
Reeves and Security #1, this hasnt been the case (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Reeves, 2006 
[Telephone Interview]; Security #1, 2006 [Telephone interview]).   
The Arab militias still operate in Darfur under virtual impunity from the law.  
Stiansen views the GoS as having lost control of the Janjaweed and expresses that if the 
GoS tried to disarm them, they would turn on the GoS (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).  Still 
this is a brazen breach of the negotiated agreement that goes hand in hand with the other 
obstructions the GoS imposes on the ICs POC efforts. The lack of control by the GoS for 
parties which are believed to be operating under their orders has created a very 
fragmented, chaotic environment in Darfur. Some of the interviewees feel the situation 
must be reined in by the GoS in order for the IC to carry out its protection duties (Pronk, 
2006 [Interview]; Reeves, 2006 [Telephone Interview]; Security #1, 2006 [Telephone 
interview]).     
  
5.1.3.2 Blocking of the international communitys tactical efforts.   At the tactical 
level, the GoS is seen by the interviewees as blocking many of the ICs humanitarian 
supplies and AUs security equipment.  There is also a pattern of harassing the 
humanitarian personnel in Darfur.   Reeves has recorded the GoS denying entry to 
medical supplies, helicopters, fuel, and the main offensive weapon of the AMIS, the 12.7 
mm machine gun for their armored personnel carriers (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone 
 61
interview]). These desperately needed logistical supplies have been linked to the ICs 
efforts in conducting its protection duties.  
The humanitarians told a similar tale of their associates having a difficult time 
getting into Sudan.  Humanitarian #3 has had many of her personnel destined for Darfur 
to be turned around at the airport in Khartoum due to regulations on travel permits which 
change indiscriminately (Humanitarian #3, 2006 [Interview]).  Coupled with this 
challenge of entry into Sudan is the issue for staying once one arrives.  Humanitarian #2 
experienced security officers detaining aid workers even if they had all the correct 
permits.  She stressed that if one protested in the slightest bit to detainment, GoS officials 
would declare that individual Persona Non-Grata and he or she would have 24 hours to 
leave the country.  This had happened on numerous occasions to several of her colleagues 
(Humanitarian #2, 2006 [Telephone Interview]).  Humanitarian #3 thought the arrests 
which occurred within her organization were timed by the GoS to detract attention from 
the military activities that were in violation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
(Humanitarian #3, 2006 [Interview]).   The interference which the IC has experienced 
makes the protection and relief work all the more difficult. 
In summation, the three areas where the IC has encountered problems with its 
protection efforts are: the ICs approach towards security, the strategy practiced by the 
humanitarians, and the obstacles on the ICs security and humanitarian operations created 
by the GoS. Before a solution to these problems will be presented, a brief discussion will 
follow on the variables which have emerged in answering research A. 
 
5.1.4 Discussion of research question A   
The six variables described concerning the problems facing the ICs third partys 
security efforts are: (1) strategy; (2) manpower; (3) mandate; (4) logistics; (5) expertise; 
and (6) relationship between the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN).   It is 
significant that five of the six variables (strategy, manpower, mandate, logistics, and 
expertise) have been indirectly listed among other variables in published reports by the 
Brooking Institution/Bern University (2005), Refugees International (2005), and the 
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International Crisis Group (2005).   These five variables appear to be valid based on a 
comparison of three circulated documents from recognized independent think-tanks 
which primarily focus on the AUs security force in Darfur.  These variables can be 
linked to the lack of security and have affected the most immediate priorities of the ICs 
security efforts.   
 The sixth variable, the relationship between the AU and UN, highlights the 
interaction between the regional and global levels in representing the IC. The global level 
represented by the UN is finding itself dependent on regional organizations to carry out 
security operations at the request of its member states.   Buzan and Wævers Regional 
Security Complex Theory (2003) have noted the rise in the importance of the regional 
level as represented by post-modern organizations like the AU in having an expanded 
involvement in security operations. Such has been the case in Bosnia with the 
involvement of the European Union.  However, as noted by Kingabe, in order for security 
to be provided for in Darfur by the IC, a partnership between the regional and global 
level is critical (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). Yet according to some of the interviewees 
this partnership is experiencing some issues. 
The relationship problem between the AU and the UN might stem from the fact 
that the UN and AU compete for the same resources to fund their organizations. Two out 
of every three US dollars that support the AU come from the same western donor states 
which are seen as major contributors to the UN (Boulden, 2003).  The undertaking of the 
AMIS in Darfur is by far the largest monetary source of income the AU has.  Between 
October 2004 and October 2005, the AMIS cost almost a quarter of a billion US dollars, 
which is five times the AUs entire budget in 2004 (Mail and Guardian, 2004).  This 
litmus test by the AU in Darfur appears to be seen as the AUs moment to shine and 
establish this newly recast organization in the eyes of the IC. However, with the 
likelihood that the AU might have to relinquish the command of security operations to 
the UN, such an action could fester continued ill-will between the two organizations 
which need to maintain a united front in order for the ICs security efforts to be most 
effective. 
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   The protection by presence strategy practiced by the humanitarians is viewed as 
having great shortcomings.  As noted by the humanitarians, the strategy requires the 
actual presence of humanitarian personnel to function. Yet when protection is needed 
most in the camps either at night or during times of insecurity, the humanitarians must 
leave the area.  The displaced are most vulnerable during these situations.  Due to the 
lack of security in Darfur, humanitarian organizations are scaling back operations.  The 
UN has withdrawn entirely from the northern territory of Darfur where it had been 
providing basic services for a half million people (United Nations Daily News, 2006).  
The increase of insecurity makes the protection by presence strategy more cumbersome 
to implement when humanitarian organizations are recalling staff and downsizing 
operations. 
   
The other two variables the research unearthed were the lack of control exhibited 
by the GoS over its allied Arab militia forces like the Janjaweed and the tactical 
obstructions the GoS has used to block the ICs humanitarian and security protection 
efforts.  It was noted earlier that one of the root causes of the conflict was the competition 
between two ways of life, the nomadic groups and the farming communities over 
depleting land and water resources. The GoS has chosen to support the pastoralists in 
Darfur.  This Arab nomadic group forms the basis from which the GoS sponsored 
Janjaweed operate. Given the lawless environment of Darfur, the observation by Stiansen 
that if the GoS were to curb the campaign of violence by the Janjaweed, the Janjaweed 
would in fact turn on the GoS (Stiansen, 2006 [interview]). This possibility makes the 
situation tense.  The GoS has a vast, unmanageable territory under its domain.  To 
maintain control the GoS must make local alliances with certain militia groups (The 
Global IDP Project, 2005). There is evidence of this in Darfur as well as in other parts of 
the country. In the past this has been the case in the south with the GoS supporting local 
elements which comprise the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) in fighting the SPLM.   
The other variable in this section, concerns the obstacles experienced by the IC in 
terms of the GoS blocking efforts to protect. These obstacles have become more 
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pronounced in recent months.  In the recent past the GoS expelled from the country, the 
Norwegian Refugee Council which was managing one of the largest IDP camps in Darfur 
(Sudan Tribune, 2006d).  The GoS has also impeded the efforts of high level UN officials 
like Jan Egeland in visiting Darfur to assess the situation (Ibid).  These obstacles have 
plagued the ICs humanitarian and security efforts to protect and added to preventing an 
increased build-up of operations in the region.  A logical question arises as to what the IC 
can do to address these challenges.  Research question B will provide suggestions as to 
what the interviewees believe to be the best means to increase the physical safety of the 
local population. 
 
5.2 Research question B) According to the professionals, what can be done to address 
these problems in order to more effectively impact the immediate protection priorities of 
the civilians of Darfur? 
 
This section will introduce the solutions suggested by the interviewees in 
addressing the problems encountered by the IC to address the civilians most immediate 
protection needs along with a discussion on their application.  The format will have 
possible solutions divided into three categories as previously listed: (1) solutions to the 
problems that the IC has experienced with its security activities; (2) solution to the 
protection by presence strategy that has been adopted by the humanitarian community; 
and (3) solutions to the GoSs obstacles created for the IC.  The variables presented will 
attempt to demonstrate needed steps to increase the ICs protection efforts to minimize 
civilian causalities and further decrease the Crude Mortality Rate in Darfur. 
 
5.2.1 Solutions to the problems the international community has experienced with its 
third party security efforts 
   With respect to the ICs approach to security as led by the AU, the six variables 
which have been listed as problems need to be addressed to increase the protection on the 
ground for the civilians of Darfur.  Based on the interviews, these solutions are an 
attempt to get an appropriate strategy in place, manpower, mandate, logistics, expertise, 
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and maintaining the relationship between the AU and the UN to reflect the responsibility 
to protect rhetoric of the IC. 
  
  5.2.1.1 Changing strategy.  Reeves succinctly pinpoints the strategy for any 
security presence in Darfur, saying: We need a peacemaking, not a peacekeeping force 
because there is no peace to keep (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone interview]). These 
sentiments also resonate with Pronk and Kingabe (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Kingabe, 
2006 [Interview]).  A peace enforcement operation is a mechanism recognized as 
addressing the shortfalls of the current peacekeeping operation in Darfur.  This action 
will expand the Rules of Engagement to pro-actively take on POC infractions beyond the 
limited engagements which Security #1 has noted earlier in his current list of duties 
(Security #1, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  This translates into improving the capacity of 
the IC in regard to the next four variables. 
 
5.2.1.2 Increase manpower.   There is agreement by all the interviewees that the 
ICs security presence needs to continue to expand. Having a larger security presence is a 
noted variable which the interviewees believe will better the POC situation and reduce 
civilian causalities.  However, they have different opinions concerning how much the 
force should be increased. Leading the UNMIS, Pronk foresees a force that should 
incorporate the current AMIS force plus an additional 8,000 troops for a total of 15,000 
personnel (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). On the other hand, Reeves makes the case that a 
bare bones minimum of 20,000 troops is called for.  He stresses this number is needed 
given the extreme, unforgiving terrain of Darfur. However, if the chances are that a 
security force might run the risk of being deployed in a non-permissive environment, the 
force will need to be a great deal larger than 20,000 (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone 
interview]).  This means an increased presence of at least two to three times the current 
troop levels are needed to appropriately carry out protection activities in curbing the 
violence.      
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5.2.1.3 Strengthen mandate.  Many of the interviewees mentioned strengthening 
the mandate under which the AMIS operates as a tool to better address the most 
immediate protection needs of the local population. This would move the pacific 
settlement of disputes outlined in the current Chapter VI to a more coercive use of force 
in dealing with acts of aggression stipulated by a Chapter VII mandate (United Nations, 
1945).   Stiansen makes the case, Of course if you had a stronger mandate, Chapter VII 
you then could have better protection of civilians (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). A 
proactive Chapter VII mandate would give the AMIS a better chance at ensuring the 
safety and security for the population of Darfur.  In light of his job, Security #1 views this  
as one of the most important actions the IC can take to improve the immediate protection 
priorities for the civilians (Security #1, 2006 [Telephone interview]).   
Despite the lack of a strong mandate, the current AMIS force in Darfur has taken 
on additional measures to protect. Beyond his monitoring duties, Security #1 is 
responsible for: 
Confidence building and security building patrols which are aimed at protecting 
the local population to give them the feeling that they are protected and that they 
have a communication medium which they can use to report any problems and 
pending attacks (Ibid).  
 
Kingabe terms these measures to which Security #1 refers as aggressive 
patrolling (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). The AMIS force uses these patrols as a deterrent 
for attacks or just to show a presence (Ibid).  These patrols demonstrate that the AU has 
attempted to take a proactive posture with its protection duties. Kingabe also highlights 
the use of military diplomacy as a proactive tactic which the AU has employed to 
diffuse a developing situation (Ibid). The AU engages members of the warring factions in 
dialogue to thwart a planned offensive (Ibid). These creative measures developed by the 
AMIS go beyond just a military stance.  As confirmed by the Peace and Security Council 
of the AU, according to Kingabe, their interpretation of their mandate needs to be 
expanded until a much more robust mandate is established to protect civilians and with 
that the approval of the required manpower to achieve such ends (Ibid).  These proactive 
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patrolling measures are necessary for the AMIS to increase civilian protection in lieu of 
the appropriate mandate.  Still, the interviewees believe that having a clearly worded 
Chapter VII mandate to protect with the appropriate force level is vital.  
 
5.2.1.4 Improve logistics.  Kingabe comments that the logistical shortfalls 
experienced by the AMIS are due to a lack of resource support.   Kingabe understands 
that in the joint partnership between the AU and IC, more resource support is needed to 
take on the additional mandate to protect (Ibid). He acknowledges the lack of resources is 
an area which they cannot maintain on their own. He notes, It worked out well in the 
sense that the international community was in the deal, was that they had the AU more or 
less doing a sub-contractor work (Ibid). Hansen and Reeves specifically point out the 
need for helicopters to patrol the immense territory of Darfur (Hansen, 2006 [Interview]; 
Reeves, 2006 [Interview]). Humanitarian #2 suggests, Getting the kind of logistical 
support, airlifting in supplies, and getting additional kind of vehicles (Humanitarian #2, 
2006 [Telephone interview]).  In addition, there is fundamental need for better armament 
to engage the lawless elements in Darfur who are committing acts of violence against the 
local population.  Such logistic improvements are seen by the interviewees as being a 
variable which would advance the ICs security efforts in Darfur.  
 
5.2.1.5 Training to increase expertise.   As noted by the humanitarians, the lack of 
training by the police component within the AMIS has made their working together a 
challenging experience.  Some of the interviewees believe that there needs to be better 
trained security personnel in Darfur. Suggestions from Humanitarian #1 and #2 include 
sensitivity training and contextual knowledge of the conflict for security personnel 
(Humanitarian #1, 2006 [Interview]; Humanitarian #2, 2006 [Telephone interview]). This 
variable concerning training is recognized as aiding the efforts of the ICs security 
component and addressing the expertise inadequacies. 
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5.2.1.6 Maintain relationship between the AU and UN with command of security 
transferring to the UN.  The relationship between the AU and UN is significant to the 
protection of civilians in Darfur. Most of the interviewees stress that the ultimate device 
in impacting all the above mentioned variables (strategy, manpower, mandate, logistical, 
and expertise) of the AU security force is turning over the command and control to the 
UN. This thought is not voiced by Kingabe and Security #1, but has unanimous 
agreement among the rest of the interviewees.  Stiansen points out that having the AMIS 
under the auspices of the UN would create a much stronger mandate and more people 
on the grounds that are better equipped (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). It is believed that 
having the UN in charge of security in Darfur would improve POC. Humanitarian #2 
supports the idea, 
 to replace the AU with actual blue helmet [UN] peacekeepers with an actual 
mandate to protect people. But that would be a huge step forward in my view at 
least from the protection perspective to have people in place who can actually 
protect civilians (Humanitarian #2, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  
 
The leader of the UNMIS, Pronk, notes that he has already started planning to take 
over security operations in Darfur as confirmed by the AU Peace and Security Council in 
2006.  He advocates this plan, commenting, if the UN are so lucky to keep the AU 
troops that are present at the moment in Darfur, but make them UN troops (Pronk, 2006 
[Interview]). This illustrates the point that any security operation will be both a UN and 
AU joint effort due to the large manpower requirements involved.  It is therefore vital 
that the partnership between the AU and UN be maintained. This relationship is to ensure 
the global and regional levels maximize each others strong suits.  As noted by Kingabe 
earlier, the AU has provided the manpower with the resource support coming from the 
international community as represented by the UN (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).  The 
relationship between the two organizations must be preserved given their apparent need 
for one another in providing third party security in Darfur. 
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5.2.2 Continuous presence   
In order to curb the gender based violence and the criminal activities being carried 
out in camps, a 24-7 presence of the humanitarians and the AMIS police component is 
warranted to fulfill the protection by presence strategy.  The camps must be made safe 
enough so that the humanitarians can have an actual presence, as well as carry out their 
duties in providing basic services. As cited by Marshall the humanitarian environment 
is decreasing due to the amount of insecurity (Marshall, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  
He believes that the IC needs to get more forcefully and more efficiently on the 
ground to ensure better POC (Ibid).  This thought is shared by many of the other 
interviewees.  The humanitarians also need to be present in the camps with their 
international staff to meet the basic requirements of their protection by presence strategy. 
The humanitarians maintain that when the IC is present, atrocities against civilians 
seldom occur. Humanitarian #1 notes: 
Our role it to pressure and work with armed protection services as well, the GoS, 
the GoS police, particularly the AMIS.  We have done a lot of pressuring to get 
AMIS to have a presence around the camps and that has made a big difference 
(Humanitarian #1, 2006 [Interview]).  
 
These efforts to increase the presence of the ICs security services should be extended to 
a round the clock presence. 
 
5.2.3 Application of smart and political sanctions   
 The common recommendation gathered by the data to combat the obstacles and 
violations by the GoS and warring parties is the imposition of smart sanctions against 
their leadership by banning travel, freezing assets abroad, and political condemnation.  
The current economic sanctions in place, such as the USs bilateral trade sanctions 
are viewed by the interviewees as not being successful. Stiansen notes that these 
economic sanctions are being undermined and they never proved that effective 
(Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).  Pronk shares these sentiments saying, Economic sanctions 
against the country, no. It wouldnt make sense.  They [the GoS] just care about 
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themselves at the moment [] but not sanctions against the population, but sanctions 
against those who are responsible (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). Some of the interviewees 
foresee the application of smart sanctions targeting the leadership of the GoS and the 
warring parties, not the people, as being the most effective means by which to pressure 
the parties to cooperate better with the IC.   
These smart sanctions can be divided into two groups.  The first focuses on the 
leadership as individuals and the second addresses them as a group. For the individual 
leaders of the GoS and warring parties, Pronk envisions travel sanctions, along with the 
freezing of personal financial assets outlined in the United Nations Security Councils 
Resolution 1591 (Ibid) . However, these have not been universally enforced by all 
member states according to Pronk (Ibid). Certain states have been more willing to enforce 
these measures than others.  It is required that all states implement the recommendations 
made by the resolution, yet divisions within the ranks of the IC have made this a difficult 
task. 
The other proposal which could prove useful against the GoS as a whole is the 
continued application of political sanctions.  Stiansen observes that when the GoS was 
denied the AU chairmanship in early 2006, that the denial: 
 was a serious snub for the president and the government as a whole.  This 
episode also demonstrated that the Sudan will continue to have a special status 
until the crisis in Darfur, and other flash points, are dealt with in a satisfactory 
manner (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).   
 
In order to get the GoS to comply with the ICs efforts in Darfur, it may be 
necessary to prevent GoS leadership roles or its political involvement in collective state 
organizations.  Both these measures within the smart sanction framework need to be 
forcefully and collectively applied by all members of the IC to ensure the GoS knows that 
the IC is serious about its protection activities.  This smart sanctions variable is the only 
solution provided by the interviewees in which the IC can censor the warring parties in an 
attempt to overcome the challenges they have put forth.   
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The answers to research question B provide recommendations for the three 
categories with the ICs approach to third party security, humanitarian strategy, and 
complications created by the GoS. A discussion of these solutions will highlight certain 
points that should be taken into consideration concerning their application.   
 
5.2.4 Discussion of research question B 
The six recommendations according the interviewees that can assist the IC with 
the problems it is encountering with its security approach are: (1) adopt a more 
appropriate strategy; (2) increase manpower; (3) strengthen mandate; (4) improve 
logistics; (5) more training to increase expertise; and (6) better relationship between AU 
and UN. A few observations can be made regarding these variables. 
The strategy employed by the IC to provide for POC needs to be a peace 
enforcement operation, not a peacekeeping one.  This strategy has an effect on the 
mandate, logistics, manpower and training variables.  The current chapter VI mandate of 
the AU peacekeeping force dictates a lightly armed presence operating under the consent 
of the parties.  This Chapter VI mandated mission is supposed to keep the peace so that a 
negotiated settlement can be reached.  Stressed by Reeves, there appears no need for a 
peacekeeping mission since there is no peace to keep given the repeated violations to the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (Reeves, 2006 [Interview]).  As noted by the Tactic 
Manual for Nordic Peace Support Operations, a peace enforcement operation is required 
to compel the parties to comply with a specific course of action, which in the case of 
Darfur is the protection of civilians (Committee of Nordic Co-operated Arrangement for 
Military Peace Support, 2002).   
Due to the warring parties non-compliance, a Chapter VII mandated mission is 
required. This translates into the need for a much more heavily armed force to achieve 
these ends (Ibid). According to the data the security presence in Darfur has basic logistic 
shortfalls, for example, vehicles and helicopters.  If a mandate were in place to permit a 
much more robust force, the logistics involved would be much greater.  So far just 
meeting basic transportation requirements has been a challenge.  Questions arise as to 
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how such a force would be able to ramp-up its equipment to meet the logistic necessities 
of more proactive mandate. 
Another factor to be aware of with the application of a more robust mandate would 
be its implications for the Rules of Engagement. A Chapter VII mandate would expand 
the Rules of Engagement (Ibid).  The use of deadly force would no longer limit the ICs 
security arm to its application in self-defense situations only.  The tactical decision to 
protect civilians by the IC might have further reaching political consequences at higher 
levels if the ICs troops are engaging the warring parties in combat in order to protect 
Darfurs population.  The possibility of misinterpretation by the ICs well intended 
protection actions could have an unforeseen negative impact in other areas.   
The recommendation for increased capacity of manpower is warranted to address 
the shortfall of personnel variable.  Experts familiar with peace operations note there 
should be three and half soldiers for every 1,000 people in need of protection (Dobbins et 
al, 2005).  This puts the number needed in Darfur at a minimum of 20,000 troops.  As 
noted by Reeves this number can easily be expanded if you factor in the lack of 
infrastructure, hostile terrain, and the thousands of communities spread over long 
distances (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  With the current strategy in place there 
needs to be a presence in order to protect.  Pronk has suggested that 15,000 troops would 
suffice, but it appears that number needs to be higher, more in line with Reeves 
recommendation of at least 20,000 (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Reeves, 2006 [ Telephone 
interview]). This increase in personnel might be a difficult task based on the deficit of 
manpower that the UNMIS is experiencing in the south of the country.  The UNMIS is 
still 3,000 troops short of its mandated target of 10,000 since it first deployed 18 months 
ago (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). Since the UNMIS is viewed by the IC as taking over 
security operations in Darfur, its under capacity of personnel in the south of Sudan might 
be evident to a similar problem that could occur in Darfur.   
 The lack of expertise variable which the data has mentioned concerning the AU 
personnel is only noted by the humanitarians.  The view that humanitarians hold of their 
security counterparts might be culturally based given the different backgrounds of each 
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group.  The AU troops hail from developing, mostly pre-modern countries in Africa, 
whereas the humanitarians are from developed, post-modern states.  Initiatives have been 
funded by developed countries such as Norway with its Training for Peace (2003) 
program to educate African police personnel on western police practices.  Training for 
Peace helps provide a common platform which enable police and other peacekeeping 
personnel to be on the same operational level regardless of cultural background when 
working within internationally sponsored protection ventures (Ibid).  These programs 
could be expanded to further standardize practices to better assist within protection 
activities which are diverse in their staff composition.     
The salvation of the manpower, mandate, logistical, and expertise shortcomings of 
the AUs security apparatus are believed by most of the interviewees to be most 
effectively addressed by turning over the responsibility to provide for the physical 
security of the region to the UN.  In mid-March 2006, the AU has in fact agreed in 
principle to make such a move. Yet as evident by remarks by Pronk and Kingabe, there 
will need to be a continued partnership between the two organizations because of the 
manpower shortages the UN is experiencing with operations in the south of Sudan 
(Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).  The partnership between the two 
organizations is therefore vital for the protection activities. 
  
 The recommendation to have a 24-7 presence by the humanitarians in the camps 
to protect the displaced population when they are their most vulnerable might also have 
the unintended consequence of putting them in harms way as well.  With the insecurity 
of Darfur well documented, the international staffing of camps might for good reason be 
limited.  Until the physical security of the region improves the humanitarians are left with 
their hands tied regarding their activities.   
  
 In order to combat the obstructions put in place by the GoS, all actors who 
comprise the IC should project a unified stance.  The smart sanctions recommended by 
the interviews can only work if all members of the IC honor them. Thus far there have 
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already been examples of member states having violated travel restrictions on GoS 
officials. For example, England permitted the head of the GoSs intelligence services to 
receive medical treatment in London despite a record of human rights violations carried 
out against the civilians of Darfur (BBC News, 2006a). Acting as single entity in the eyes 
of the warring factions in Darfur is necessary for the IC to get the parties to adhere to the 
standards of protection the IC has demanded from them.  Divisions within the IC will 
only impede the ICs security and humanitarian efforts and could well be exploited by the 
GoS and warring factions. 
 
5.3 Research Question C) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the 
international community has encountered in addressing the more long term protection 
priorities of the civilians in Darfur? 
 
 In addressing research question C, the interviewees responses can be divided into 
five areas which they believe are problems the IC is experiencing when impacting the 
populations long term protection priorities.  The main problem sets are: (1) the lack of 
commitment to negotiated agreements; (2) the peace process in Abuja; (3) the lack of a 
functioning ceasefire agreement; (4) political power sharing; and (5) wealth sharing. 
These categories can be connected to the political activities conducted by the IC, led by 
the AU.  
 
5.3.1 Lack of commitment by the warring parties   
The hypothesis for research question C was that one of the main sources 
concerning the issue of protection was the deficiency in commitment by the warring 
parties to the negotiated Humanitarian ceasefire agreement.  Kingabe mentions that one 
of the most common hindrances by the interviewees is, the parties of the conflict were 
not going to live by their commitments (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). From the tactical 
level, Security #1 notes, Disregard for the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement by all 
parties in the conflict is the single most attributed source for the lack of protection and 
physical safety of civilians (Security #1, 2006 [Telephone interview]). Pronk and 
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Stiansen also understand the lack of commitment to ceasefire agreement has undermined 
civilian protection (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). Stiansen 
comments, Something of course, you must never ever ease or forget to insist the parties 
must honor agreements they have signed, and the GoS has responsibilities to provide a 
safe environment for its civilians (Ibid). This non-commitment to political agreements is 
a factor critical to the protection needs of the civilian population. 
Based on the responses of the interviewees, it appears that the hypothesis for 
research questions C is strengthened by the data. One of the main sources for the 
protection shortcomings experienced by the IC is the lack of commitment of the warring 
parties to their negotiated agreements, such as the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. 
This history of non-commitment to their negotiated obligations by the warring parties, 
either because they are unwilling or unable to do so, is clearly an area that the IC must 
address if any new political agreements are put in place to resolve the conflict. There are 
also other factors which the interviewees mention along with the hypothesis for research 
question C. 
 
5.3.2 Peace talks in Abuja 
 When it comes to the peace talks concerning Darfur in Abuja, there has been a 
comparison made between those talks and the peace talks which recently concluded 
between the north and the south of the country. Stiansen highlights a point shared by 
some of the interviewees:  
The Darfur talks are much more complex and complicated than the talks between 
the north and the south for the CPA. Its just much more difficult, in the south we 
had a fairly predictable environment; we knew the players.  In Darfur its not the 
case at all (Ibid).  
  
Despite these problems with the peace talks, according to Pronk, Abuja is the only game 
in town (Pronk, 2006 [interview]).  There are five factors which the interviewees find 
fault with the current peace talks. The first is the issue of legitimacy which has made it 
much more cumbersome for the IC to address the issue of who represents the genuine 
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interests of the people of Darfur and whether or not all the parties who should be 
participating in the negotiation progress are involved. The second category is the 
fragmentation within the opposition parties at the negotiating table.  The third and fourth 
categories are the quality of leadership within the rebel groups both on the ground and at 
the negotiations. Finally, the fifth is the overfacilitation of the peace process by the IC. 
These five problematic areas are variables which need to be addressed for the political 
efforts conducted on behalf of the people of the region.    
 
5.3.2.1 Legitimacy.  One of the cited threats to the long term needs of POC by 
Pronk and Stiansen revolves around the concept of legitimacy in political representation 
(Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).   Even though the talks have yet to 
be concluded, Stiansen makes a point: 
Here in the case in Darfur you have a legitimacy question, but the question can 
they actually deliver, are the people with them.  Are the negotiators at the talks 
able to deliver on the ground?  Can they get the promises that are made at the talks 
implemented on the ground? (Ibid)  
 
According to Pronk concerning the discussions in Abuja,  power and wealth 
being discussed between the GoS and the movements, neither of the two and the 
movements are many, are representative of the real perspective of the people of Darfur 
concerning power or wealth (Pronk, 2006, [Interview]). 
The issue is that the people do not feel represented by either the GoS or the 
warring factions. Humanitarian #3 says, you have a large percentage of the population 
that hasnt taken any sides in the conflict and have tried to stay neutral.  And they are not 
even a part of the negotiations (Humanitarian #3, 2006 [Interview]).  Even if an 
agreement is reached, there is some doubt that it will actually be implemented by all the 
people and parties whose voices are missing in its creation.   
This limited popular mandate to negotiate as a variable also extends to certain 
groups who are key players in the conflict. Arab militia groups including the infamous 
Janjaweed are mysteriously absent from the political process.  Pronk is concerned that an 
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agreement in Abuja will be contested by those who were not included in the deal, 
especially those groups who are armed and have been involved in the majority of the 
fighting (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]).  The Arab militias have been the extension of the 
GoSs military in Darfur and if such involved groups are nonexistent from the peace 
negotiations, it could cause serious implementation problems for the peace agreement.  
Pronk also brings attention to the fact that in past negotiations that produced agreements 
like the Humanitarian Ceasefire, the Arab militias were not included and as previously 
mentioned the results of its execution were disastrous (Ibid). With having just three 
parties present in Abuja, the GoS and the two rebel groups, the SLM and the JEM, the 
exclusive nature of the peace process raises the question of legitimacy. 
The legitimacy variable could very well have a negative impact on the application 
to any agreement reached in Abuja.  The implementation of any agreement would be 
severely questioned and even challenged if it does not have the backing of the people and 
all the parties involved. This factor warrants further attention in order to secure a lasting 
solution in the peace process.  
 
5.3.2.2 Fragmentation.  The second variable is the split within the opposition 
parties. Pronk recognizes that divisions within the parties are hampering the ICs political 
efforts in Abuja (Ibid).  Hansen remarks that these rebel groups are: 
 split, lack of unity, they lack good leaders and good negotiators.  They have 
added to the situation by messing everything up.  They havent understood the 
worst thing you can do for yourself is not be unified (Hansen, 2006 [Interview]).  
 
The SLM has at times fielded two separate delegations at the negotiation table.  
Given the different backgrounds of the JEM and SLM, these groups have fought among 
themselves, slowing down the negotiations.  A three or sometimes four way negotiation 
process between the opposition parties and the GoS in Abuja has certainly created a 
challenging atmosphere in forging a satisfactory peace accord for all parties and the 
region of Darfur as a whole.     
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5.3.2.3 Quality of leadership.  The quality of the leadership within the rebel 
movements is another impediment weakening the peace talks. Hansen comments on the 
rebel leadership, The few academic leaders, they have been chased out. The only ones 
left in the leadership role are warlords that believe the only power is only in the barrel of 
a gun.  They are in command (Ibid). This lack of a political mindset within the ranks of 
the rebel factions makes the diplomatic activities all the more difficult in achieving a 
settlement. 
   
5.3.2.4 Quality of the negotiators.  As is the case with legitimacy of the people and 
parties, the negotiators of the opposition movements are seen as not even representing the 
interests of their own groups.  Pronk tells of meeting with the rebel leaders in Abuja, 
saying:  
If you talk with the leaders in Abuja and you ask where do you live? 
Birmingham, sir; Amsterdam, sir; I am coming from Chicago.  They all come 
from outside.  It really means they dont have a real life need to change their own 
situation outside (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]).  
 
The absence of negotiators actually residing in Darfur plays into the previously 
mentioned legitimacy issue.  Besides not representing the people, they also have a 
disconnection with their own groups who are carrying out the fighting. There is no real 
incentive for the rebel negotiators to reach an agreement for their own sakes.  In fact, 
those familiar with the talks wonder if the desire by the negotiators might be to drag out 
the talks due to other misguided factors by the IC in assisting the peace process.   
 
5.3.2.5 Overfacilitation of peace talks.  The Abuja process is faulted by Pronk as 
being overfacilitated by the IC.  This is in contrast to past peace processes where 
negotiations broke down because they werent facilitated at all.  Pronk comments that the 
negotiators,  
They are being paid to negotiate, not being paid to reach a result.  To reach a 
result would mean for many they would not get a per diem anymore. They dont 
have a power organization. So why should they reach a result? [] I sense a 
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greater desire to get peace on the ground at all sides, the GoS on the ground, the 
rebels on the ground than I sense in Abuja (Ibid).  
 
The monetary compensation which the IC is paying the rebel delegations might 
have the unintended consequence of prolonging the peace talks.  Most of the interviewees 
remark about the delay and express apprehension concerning the extended amount of 
time taken to finalize a settlement. This factor coupled with the division within the ranks 
of the opposite factions, the quality of leadership and the lack of association to the 
conflict situation might be extending the peace process and have added to an increased 
likelihood that an agreement reached in Abuja might not be an enduring one.   
 
5.3.3 Absence of a functioning ceasefire agreement 
In addition to the issues of commitment and the peace process in Abuja is the 
absence of an effective ceasefire mechanism for Darfur.  This device is viewed by several 
of the interviewees as being a critical precursor to any peace agreement that is reached 
and implemented.  Marshall, Reeves, Pronk and Humanitarian #1 all mention the 
importance of having a working ceasefire in place before the negotiations in Abuja 
should have begun (Marshall, 2006 [Telephone interview]; Reeves, 2006 [Telephone 
interview]; Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Humanitarian #1, 2006 [Interview]).   
The Humanitarian Ceasefire has clearly proven to be a fictional ceasefire 
agreement in practice. Pronk observes,  
 the ceasefire agreement from NDjamena which is flawed fully.  It is 
being violated time and again, nearly on a day to day basis and its violations are 
noted, but they are not being discussed, not being addressed, not being sanctioned 
(Pronk, 2006 [Interview]).  
 
This is problematic for the peace talks which are attempting to reach an agreement over 
highly contested topics such as political power and economic wealth.  Pronk also 
emphasizes that, You need to trust each other that you dont attack each other, even 
more if you disagree or dont yet agree in order to continue to find a solution (Ibid). This 
logic can only be applied when there is a genuine ceasefire in place.  The parties in 
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Darfur continue to fight despite sitting at the negotiation table in Abuja and that makes it 
much more challenging to arrive at a meaningful peace agreement to which they will 
commit.  Any agreement made under duress could have a much more difficult time being 
implemented than one created in the kind of trusting environment Pronk suggests.  
 
5.3.4 Political power sharing 
Several interviewees blame the IC for its sequencing of the peace processes. This 
has diminished the political power sharing component within Abuja which is seen as 
addressing the marginalization of Darfur. The IC made a conscious decision to deal with 
the CPA between the north and south first, before concentrating on Darfur.  Hansen gives 
an account at a state toast in June 2005 when John Garang, the former leader of the 
SPLM of the south, insisted on having a reference to Darfur in the CPA document.  
GoS Vice President Taha told him if you insist, we will not sign and 
finally the Norwegian advisor had to enter and persuade [Garang] to accept that 
there wouldnt be a reference to Darfur within the CPA (Hansen, 2006 
[Interview]).   
 
In hindsight this sequencing decision is believed to have caused serious problems 
with the peace talks in Abuja.  Stiansen notes that by not linking Darfur with the signing 
of the CPA,  
the issue of the power sharing arrangement with the CPA; it is now more 
difficult to solve the crisis in Darfur.  The rebels of Darfur are concerned about the 
power and wealth sharing at the center in Khartoum, what is left of the cake after 
the GoS and SPLM have taken doesnt really meet their wants (Stiansen, 2006 
[Interview]).  
 
The cake analogy has been voiced on a few different occasions within the 
interviews.  The sequencing mistake is viewed by Marshall as severely undermining the 
success of a peace agreement coming out of Abuja for Darfur due to the fact that there is 
no political power left to negotiate over (Marshall, 2006 [Telephone interview]).   
The political power sharing component has been much trickier to hammer out in 
Abuja.  Along with the peace talks themselves, this is evident in the time that it is taking 
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for the parties to reach an agreement. As commented on by Humanitarian #3, The 
political process in Abuja is disturbingly slow (Humanitarian #3, 2006 [Interview]). 
Such frustration has been echoed within most of the interviews.  There needs to be ways 
in which the IC can address the political power variable that has been altered with the 
sequencing of Darfur after the CPA. 
 
5.3.5 Wealth sharing 
  Along with the political power sharing component is wealth sharing.  This 
variable is also believed to address some of the causes of the conflict associated with the 
marginalization of Darfur. Pronk understands land rights to be a critical issue (Pronk, 
2006 [Interview]).   In advising the AU negotiations on wealth sharing, Stiansen 
mentions, One of the most important levels that dictates one of the more long term levels 
of the war is the environmental degradation, competition for land (Stiansen, 2006 
[Interview]).  The IC needs to confront the competition for resources to assist in 
alleviating one of the sources of the conflict between GoS sponsored forces and the 
opposition groups.  
In addition to the land issue, within this wealth power sharing framework, is the 
more fair distribution of wealth between the GoS and the region of Darfur to ease 
marginalization.  Marshall, Reeves, and Hansen comment that a problem has been that 
the GoS not honored its wealth sharing agreements in the CPA with the SPLM in the 
south of the country regarding revenue the GoS has promised the SPLM (Marshall, 2006 
[Telephone interview]; Reeves, 2006 [Telephone interview]; Hansen, 2006 [Interview]). 
This fosters mistrust in the Abuja negotiations.  Reeves believes the GoS in the CPA is 
doing a, full scale reneging on their wealth sharing protocol commitment (Reeves, 
2006 [Telephone interview]). He continues to point out that the people of the Darfur have 
seen the, agreement [CPA] has not being upheld by Khartoum which provides the 
incentive to fight (Ibid).  Hansen notes that they [the GoS] havent given them 
[SPLM] that money so far, it is a shame (Hansen, 2006 [Interview]). To ensure that all 
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parties will agree and honor any settlement that is reached, the IC must address this issue 
of wealth sharing. 
  
The five categories presented in answering research question C are: (1) lack of 
commitment; (2) peace process in Abuja; (3) lack of a functioning ceasefire agreement; 
(4) political power sharing; and (5) wealth sharing.  These variables serve as the basis of 
a discussion in light of the research question C. 
 
5.3.6 Discussion of Research Question C   
 The lack of commitment by the warring parties to their negotiated agreements was 
posed as the hypothesis for research question C.  The data gathered in the results appear 
to support the idea that the lack of commitment is an area which the interviewees believe 
to be one of the main sources for the deficiency in POC in Darfur.  The lack of 
commitment by the warring parties has caused the IC to greatly expand its security and 
humanitarian presence in Darfur from the initial assumption as noted by Kingabe. The 
assumption was that the third party security forces were in Darfur to monitor the 
ceasefire, not provide for civilian protection which was the duty of the warring parties 
(Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). With the warring parties not following through on their 
commitments, the IC over the last few years has had to step up its involvement, yet with a 
strategy that has been cited in research question A as having faults.  Even though the lack 
of commitment is one of the more agreed upon problems the IC is facing, other variables 
have been presented in the data which are seen as having a negative impact on the ICs 
diplomatic efforts to address the populations long term protection priorities. 
 The political efforts of the IC have been criticized by the interviewees, who cite 
variables which may have a negative impact on any agreement reached in Abuja.  First is 
the peace process itself with the issues of legitimacy of the people of Darfur and the 
parties which have been excluded from Abuja. Their exclusion could have 
implementation consequences for any peace agreement reached. There are also issues of 
fragmentation within the negotiating efforts of the warring factions, the quality of 
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leadership, the quality of the negotiators, and the overfacilitation of the peace talks are all 
areas which are seen as extending the time taken to reach an agreement.  As of spring 
2006, the peace negotiations have taken two years. During this time frame, the POC 
situation has continued to deteriorate with a growing number of casualties and displaced.  
The third problematic variable cited by the interviewees is the environment of 
distrust which is fostered in the absence of a functioning ceasefire mechanism.  The 
continuation of the fighting between the warring parties with the ongoing peace talks 
could certainly be viewed as a poor atmosphere within which to conduct negotiations.  
Recently one of the opposition factions, the JEM briefly took over the GoSs embassy in 
Chad (Sudan Tribune, 2006c).  Aggressive actions such as this raise doubt on the 
circumstances a peace agreement is crafted. 
The fourth factor which has been faulted is political power sharing. This variable 
is seen as alleviating some of the marginalization of Darfur. As commented on by the 
interviewees, the sequencing of peace processes with the CPA between the GoS and the 
south coming before the conflict in Darfur was addressed has made the sharing of power 
more difficult.  The central government of Sudan has been restructured to permit for 
SPLM to participate at the national level.  Any effort to include the represented parties of 
Darfur in Khartoum needs to contain a political power mechanism in a governmental 
system that has already undergone severe change within the last year.  
 The fifth variable, the issue of wealth sharing to address the economic 
marginalization of the region, has placed the IC in a difficult situation.  The 
environmental degradation which has occurred in Darfur along with the massive 
urbanization of the local population makes the issue of wealth more challenging to 
address.  The issue of land has been viewed as a component within the wealth framework 
warranting attention by the IC.  The IC cannot reverse environmental degradation.  Land 
reform measures have to take into account a displacement of millions of people in a 
impoverished area who might not be able to provide for themselves without relief 
assistance from the outside. 
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5.4 Research Question D) According to the professionals, what can be done to address 
these problems in order to more effectively impact the long term protection priorities of 
the civilians of Darfur? 
 
Based on the five categories listed under research question C, there is a set of 
solutions the interviewees think should be implemented so that the long term protection 
needs of the civilian population can be ensured.  In order to address the lack of 
commitment by the warring parties to their negotiated agreements, the study has 
hypothesized for research question D that Walters CCT might be helpful in addressing 
this issue.  Walters CCT (2002) postulates that the application of power sharing and 
third party security guarantees is needed for the parties to adhere to their agreements.    
These provisions are already present in the Abuja talks to get a political solution in 
place. However, the remaining four variables in answering research question C 
demonstrate some doubt as to the application of this hypothesis as the exclusive means 
for obtaining a long term solution. This is due to the peace process itself, the absence of a 
ceasefire mechanism and of problems associated with political power and wealth sharing. 
According to the interviewees, these variables must be addressed as well if the Abuja 
political process will produce an agreement that will be committed to by all parties. This 
section will offer recommendations suggested by the interviewees, along with a 
discussion on their implementation.  
 
5.4.1 Application of credible commitment theory to address lack of commitment by the 
warring parties 
The political activities of the IC, much like the security efforts, have centered on 
the AU taking the lead role on Darfur.  As noted by Kingabe in addressing the long-term 
protection priorities: 
The key to all this is the peace talks in Abuja.  The sooner they conclude, the 
sooner we have a good faith agreement, the sooner we will have an enabling 
environment in which the usually post conflict issues can be addressed by the UN 
and other organizations like the right of return (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).  
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The interviewees see the peace talks as the sole diplomatic conflict resolution 
mechanism to address the long-term protection priorities of the civilian population. When 
the interviewees were asked about the power sharing, wealth sharing and third party 
security guarantees within the hypothesis that have been discussed in the CPA as being 
applied in Abuja, they underscore the importance in principle of these variables within 
Walters CCT. Reeves, Hansen, Kingabe, Stiansen and Marshall, who are familiar with 
the political process, see the relevance in applying these variables to Darfur (Reeves, 
2006 [Telephone interview]; Hansen, 2006 [Interview]; Kingabe [Interview]; Stiansen, 
2006 [Interview]; Marshall, 2006 [Telephone interview]).  Hansen notes, I think, yes, I 
think the basic principles of the CPA can be applied to the situation in Darfur (Hansen, 
2006 [Interview]). In referring to Darfur, Stiansen comments, I think they are very 
relevant.  There are many generic principles in the CPA that have to do with power and 
wealth sharing (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). When describing the variables that make up 
the hypothesis as a whole, most of the interviewees recognize the logic in the principles 
of CCT as being the all encompassing mechanisms needed to solve the commitment 
problems of the warring parties. 
However, other factors beyond these variables need to be taken into account to 
insure that any peace agreement agreed upon will actually be implemented. Kingabe says 
in regards to the talks in Abuja, Basically, I do not see it as a long term settlement, but it 
will lay the foundations (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).  The talks in Abuja with their 
focus on power sharing, wealth sharing, and third party security guarantees are therefore 
possible just one of many steps in a long process in meeting the long-term POC concerns 
of the civilian population.  There is an underlying theme in the data that raises suspicion 
to whether the hypothesis can be the only device in addressing long term protection 
needs.   
In connection with the hypothesis for research question D the interviewees have 
noted issues with the peace talks and how they are being conducted.  Such criticism 
points out the difficulties the AU is having in trying to get a permanent conflict resolution 
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mechanism out of Abuja. In answering research question D, solutions to these variables 
will be proposed. 
 
5.4.2 Elections, composite mandate and Darfur-Darfur dialogue 
 Those familiar with the discussions in Abuja have expressed a central concern.  
They believe the voices of the civilian population need to be heard.  Stiansen stresses 
that, The people of Darfur have legitimate grievances that must be addressed and dealt 
with (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). Since the overwhelming majority of civilians have not 
been represented in Abuja, many of the interviewees suggest the holding of elections.  
Both Kingabe and Pronk are on the same page with the idea of supplementing Abuja with 
authentic Darfur ownership to any peace agreement that is reached.  Pronk remarks that 
an all inclusive, all Darfurian process as a next step after the rather flimsy results of 
the talks in Abuja and it may take quite a period []. We need elections to get a kind of 
consensus (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). This consensus will hopefully give backing to the 
commitments made in Abuja so that all the people, tribes, ethnic groups, and the militias 
that represent them will be included. Kingabe as well calls for an agreement that is 
owned by the people, such as elections and so on.  So that down the road, it is a long 
road, there will be a democratic setting for a discussion of issues, claims, counterclaims 
that are settled at the ballot box (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).  This means that for the 
long term prospects of peace, the buy-in of the population is recognized as critical to a 
lasting political solution.  
 In addressing the absence of certain parties from the negotiations, Pronk foresees 
the application of a composite mandate to guide the UNs security efforts in this 
predicament.  Pronk notes:  
There will be more Chapter VII, than Chapter VI.  I will make it a composite 
mandate, simple language, Chapter VI for the good guys, Chapter VII for the bad 
guys.  Those who are reaching a peace agreement in Abuja can be rewarded with a 
Chapter VI mandate. You want us to help you to keep the peace, but there are 
many people who are not even present in Abuja (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). 
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This means that a distinction will be made among those parties participating in the 
talks and those parties who are not.  The third party security guarantees by the IC to a 
peace agreement will be divided into two camps. The Chapter VI mandate means that 
parties involved in the talks, such as the GoS, the JEM, and the SLM, will have consented 
to the presence of a third party force.  The Janjaweed and other militia groups will have 
to have a third party security presence imposed upon them by a Chapter VII mandate.  
This device will assist the IC in dealing with one side of the legitimacy issue. 
Another recommendation is the promotion of dialogue among the people of Darfur 
to supplement any agreement coming out of Abuja.  Kingabe acknowledges that once an 
agreement is reached, we will organize a Darfur-Darfur conference and maybe 
supplement with local knowledge, local inputs (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). The Darfur-
Darfur dialogue will also employ some local conflict mechanisms to assist the political 
process in Abuja.  Kingabe and Humanitarian #3 foresee the application of devices that 
can aid the reconciliation process (Ibid; Humanitarian #3, 2006 [Interview]).  Kingabe 
gives examples of blood money and intermarriages; I am quarrelling with you, and my 
own tribal leader will offer my daughter in marriage and that will cement the relations 
between our tribes (Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]).  With this Kingabe hopes through 
the Darfur-Darfur conference these mechanisms will come into play.  They will underpin 
the mechanical agreement that is negotiated in Abuja (Ibid).  In his view, this is vital in 
addressing Darfur within its own context.  Kingabe remarks,  
At the end of the day, all conflicts cannot be reduced to a formula, a fit all 
formula. Each conflict has its local conditions, local background.  Yes, it is the 
Sudanese parties that are in Abuja negotiating, but they are using the language of 
the mediators and the advisors. They have factored in, unconsciously, the fact that 
there is need for a Darfurian ownership of whatever agreement is reached and the 
Darfur-Darfur conference that is envisioned (Ibid).  
 
The Darfur-Darfur dialogue variable is a device that can be used to seek local level 
inputs.  A formula for conflict negotiation like CCT needs to take into account the 
context in which it is applied. The local mechanisms used in the past to resolve disputes 
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in Darfur are variables that should be factored into any political resolution reached in 
Abuja. 
 
5.4.3 Working ceasefire agreement 
 To address the issue of a non-functioning ceasefire, Pronk wants to examine the 
ceasefire mechanism.  He points out, You need two mechanisms. You need a political 
mechanism and you need a force on the ground to keep it up (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). 
Both these mechanisms are in place, yet they are not working.  Pronk suggests that to get 
them working again, the chair of the Ceasefire Commission, Chad, needs to be removed.  
He notes, There is a committee chaired by Chad and the AU, Chad is a party.  Chad is 
not an independent chairman, which means the meetings are not even taking place.  You 
can continue violating everything, nobody cares (Ibid).  By removing Chad from the 
Ceasefire Commission, the IC might be able to get a functioning ceasefire agreement.  
This strategic variable is essential in getting a meaningful peace agreement in place by 
stopping the fighting which continues to threaten POC. Without such a mechanism, any 
agreement that is reached in Abuja might be undermined despite the power sharing, 
wealth sharing and third party security guarantees it might contain. 
   
5.4.4 Decentralize political power   
The division of political power between the SPLM and the GoS with the signing 
of the CPA in 2005 means there is no political power left which warring factions can 
negotiate over.  Hansen offers the suggestion of decentralizing political power in Sudan 
so that the warring factions in Darfur will have an incentive to accept a political solution 
in Abuja and address the political marginalization of the region (Hansen, 2006 
[Interview]). Even though Stiansen views this as necessary, he adds, Also keep in mind 
you must reverse decades and maybe centuries of thinking. Breaking this notion of 
centralized government, everything convenes in Khartoum (Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).  
Such an undertaking to decentralize political power in Sudan is a tricky one at best.  The 
challenge faced by the AUs negotiating efforts in Abuja might be one of several factors 
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which have been slowing down the peace process.  Getting an agreement in place to 
reflect the hypothesis for research question D based on Walters CCT, will require 
overcoming political power sharing hurdles. To achieve these ends, the GoS mindset 
forged over many years must be changed.    
 
5.4.5 Land reform 
 The marginalization of Darfur also includes the wealth issue.  Stiansen believes 
the subject of land is a critical factor with its economic marginalization (Ibid). He notes 
the IC must create mechanisms that provide access to land and the right of compensation 
(Ibid).  This will assist the IC in dealing with the wealth sharing variable at the local 
level.  Yet Stiansen also contends that the massive urbanization movement occurring over 
the last three years and the drought generated environmental degradation of the region 
have made these tasks more difficult for the IC (Ibid). 
  
 The five solutions presented in answering research question D offer 
recommendations as to how the IC can overcome the challenges to the problems it is 
facing addressing the long term protection requirements of the local population.  A 
discussion on these solutions will follow on issues which need to be taken into account 
concerning their application.  
 
5.4.6 Discussion of Research Question D 
The studys hypothesis for research question D suggest that the variables in 
Walters CCT such as power sharing and third party security guarantees might serve as 
the only means to address the issue of commitment appear to be in doubt. The third party 
security approach received the attention of research questions A and B, while the political 
power and wealth sharing compose research questions C and D.  These variables have 
been discussed at the peace talks in Abuja for the last two years. In principle the 
interviewees have agreed that the hypothesis sounds logical, but other circumstances in 
the context of Darfur might hinder the application of the hypothesis for research question 
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D as the sole political mechanism to deal with the issue of commitment.  Problematic 
variables have emerged from the data concerning the ICs political activities to achieve 
these ends. These variables will be discussed as to the practicality of their implementation 
in the context of Darfur. 
 To combat factors of legitimacy within the peace talks, the data has presented 
three suggestions.  The first is the holding of elections to bring the local population into 
the decision making process.  Darfur ownership is seen as a means by which to hear the 
vox populi or the voice of the people to propagate the adherence of a peace agreement.  
However, caution must be exercised in the application of this mechanism.  As understood 
by Roland Paris (1997), the holding of elections in a democratic forum actually fosters 
competition that can lead to violence in fragile societies.  In the context of Darfur, the 
lack of development as well as tribal and ethnic fragmentation puts the region in a class 
of societies where elections might be too destabilizing in addressing the legitimacy issue. 
 The second factor is the usage of a composite mandate for the warring parties in 
addressing the question of legitimacy.  A composite mandate of Chapter VI for the 
parties present in Abuja (the GoS, JEM, and SLM) and a Chapter VII for those who are 
not (like the Janjaweed) might have a difficult time being enforced given the chaotic 
environment of Darfur.  Trying to distinguish the warring parties in combat could be a 
difficult task for the third party security force called to enforce such a composite 
mandate.  
 The third suggestion of a Darfur-Darfur dialogue which will provide local conflict 
resolution mechanisms could have a hard time being implemented given the destruction 
of local communities in Darfur.  The massive displacement which has occurred has 
created a forced urbanization of the people.  With most of the traditional village structure 
destroyed in Darfur, these mechanisms might be lost in the new tribally mixed tent cities 
created to protect the people. 
 To address the division of political power after the CPA, the solution of 
decentralizing power is viewed as a difficult task. This is a result as commented on by 
Stiansen, with the notion of centralized power being a core concept within the GoS 
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(Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]).  Getting the GoS and SPLM to give up more political power 
to include the warring factions of Darfur in the government might be difficult. This also 
could be another one of the reasons behind the peace talks taking such a long time to 
conclude.  
 The recommendation of land reform is believed to be a key area to deal with 
problems associated with wealth sharing.  Due to the massive displacement that has 
occurred and the poverty of Sudan as a whole, compensation for the land of entire 
villages is an area which will be tough to address. One source might be the new found 
discoveries of oil within Darfur (Reuters, 2005a).  This could serve as a means by which 
to provide for the much needed development of the region whose inhabitants have 
become wards of the IC. However, the lack of oil revenue sharing between the GoS and 
SPLM stipulated by the CPA has been cited as not being fulfilled (International Crisis 
Group, 2006b). The track record of the GoSs non-execution in other wealth sharing 
protocols casts doubt to its application of the hypothesis for research question D within 
the context of Darfur. 
 
 
5.5 Summary 
 The data collected in the interviews have attempted to determine the problems the 
IC has experienced with its security, humanitarian, and political activities. Based on this 
data, a case has been made for the actions the IC should take to improve its protection 
operations concerning the immediate and long term protection needs of the Darfur 
people.  A discussion has followed each research question to expand on the described 
variables. 
To better address the immediate protection priorities of the civilian population, the 
data recommends a transition from the command and control of the AMIS to the UNMIS.  
This move might solve the manpower, mandate, logistical, expertise shortcomings which 
the interviewees have associated with the third party security presence of the AU.  The 
protection by presence strategy by the humanitarian operations stands to be strengthened 
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by having an around the clock security presence within the displacement camps.  The 
obstacles that the GoS has posed to curb the ICs security and humanitarian activities can 
be countered with smart sanctions on its leadership and the leadership of the warring 
factions.  The interviewees hope that these recommendations will have a beneficial 
impact on the challenges which the ICs security and humanitarian operations have 
encountered. 
The more long term protection concerns of the Darfur population are attempting to 
be addressed by the peace talks in Abuja.  As with security, the AU is the spearhead of 
the ICs diplomatic efforts to protect Darfurs population and find a lasting solution to the 
conflict. The data suggests that the hypothesis for research question C appears to be 
correct that the lack of commitment to the negotiated agreement is a problem for long 
term POC. In addressing this problem the hypothesis for research question D, based on 
Walters credible commitment theory, the data has hinted the variables that make up the 
hypothesis might not suffice as the sole mechanisms in bringing peace to the region and 
thus alleviating the ICs protection shortfalls. Based on the problems that the IC has 
experienced politically, the interviewees recommend the Abuja process be supplemented.  
Ownership and the input of the people to any mediated agreement are critical to ensure its 
implementation in Darfur. A working ceasefire mechanism should be put into place to 
promote a more conducive negotiating environment. Finally, the political power in Sudan 
needs to be decentralized to expand the political process along with land reform to better 
address the wealth sharing component. The interviewees most familiar with the political 
situation believe these measures will better guide the peace process by insuring that any 
agreement that is reached will stand a greater chance of being committed to.  It is 
logically viewed that with a committed peace agreement in place by all the parties in 
Darfur, the civilian causalities will be minimized and an environment conducive for 
return established. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
 
This study has scientifically attempted to analyze some of the challenges facing 
the international community and to pose possible solutions to ameliorate the protection 
crisis in Darfur. The variables collected are based on the opinions of those working 
within the international community who are most familiar with the challenges 
encountered in Darfur. Based on the data it can be concluded that while there is 
consensus that the international community is having a positive impact on protecting the 
civilians of Darfur, much more could be done to improve the safety of the local 
population.   
The answers for research question A provided insight into the security and 
humanitarian difficulties faced by the international community.  The security presence is 
lacking on many fronts.  Partially as a result, the humanitarian effort has suffered due the 
insecurity of the region.  These difficulties have only been hampered furthered by the 
Sudanese government in obstructing relief and security operations.   
Research question B has offered suggestions for addressing these challenges. The 
need to continue to improve the security efforts for POC is of critical importance in 
Darfur. The partnership between the global level represented by the UN and the regional 
by the AU must be preserved if protection work is to be effectively conducted. Only with 
a proper third party security presence in place can the humanitarian operations function 
successfully.  The officials within the GoS camp must also be held responsible for their 
actions, smart sanctions and political condemnation are two devices which are viewed as 
having the desired effect of getting the leadership of the GoS to discontinue its 
obstructions.  
The hypothesis for research question C concerning the lack of commitment is 
supported by the data.  However, this is one of many problems encountered by the 
international community regarding its political efforts in Abuja. There are other 
problematic areas involving the legitimacy of those participating in Abuja, the absence of 
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a working ceasefire agreement, and certain mechanisms viewed as being difficult to 
address such as political power and wealth sharing.  
Based on factors like legitimacy, the application of the hypothesis in answering 
research question D may not be enough to act as the sole mechanism in confronting the 
challenges faced by the international community.  This hypothesis needs to be 
supplemented with other mechanisms such as elections, inputs from the local level, the 
establishment of a functioning ceasefire, decentralization of political power and land 
reform. These are the variables which the interviewees offer as suggestions for more 
effectively addressing the crisis in Darfur.  
 
6.1 Implementation for the field 
 The data collected from a group of experienced professionals on Darfur 
demonstrates the necessity of commitment to negotiated agreements within the POC 
field. The basis from which protection operations are established center on diplomatic 
settlements that guide the international communitys security and humanitarian 
operations. Having a functioning conflict resolution mechanism is a precursor for 
adequately addressing POC concerns (Marshall, 2006 [Telephone interview]). The 
political assurances which are given by warring parties are vital for structuring an 
effective POC operation. A political framework determines what course of action the IC 
takes and how it guides the implementation process.  The case of Darfur presents what 
happens when agreements are violated and how the security and humanitarian missions 
suffer as a result.  
In achieving a political agreement, protection operations also need to take into 
account context specific factors to insure that any agreement which is reached will do a 
proper job in addressing the grievances of those involved.  The exclusive nature of the 
peace talks in Abuja is a pitfall which other peace negotiations should be wary of.   
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6.2 Further research 
 The on-going nature of the conflict Darfur and of the peace talks require continued 
follow-up. Despite a two year peace negotiation process, studies will need to be 
conducted to monitor the political situation and determine if the variables presented in 
this paper are still factors in the future.  If the solutions that have been described by this 
study are implemented, their application will warrant further attention to determine if 
they are achieving the ends for which they were designed.  The assumption by which the 
IC works  that if there is a peace agreement in place then by definition there will be 
safety  must also be tracked.   
Examining the protection challenges from multiple points of view is one of the 
most accurate means one can begin to understand such a complex phenomenon. 
However, with qualitative research, generalizing outside the context of Darfur is 
problematic in applying the studys findings to other situations. More research on the 
protection challenges faced by the international community in other conflict theaters 
might be able to better assist in determining if the variables present in this study are 
universal. 
  
 The new securitization of providing for the safety of another states civilians will 
hopefully be a field which the international community continues to support and support 
in a unified manner.  The massive involvement needed to provide protection by the 
international community is a collective effort utilizing the strong suits of many different 
state and non-state actors. This is a shared burden and its development in the post-Cold 
War order might only continue to expand given the current trend in the rising number of 
civilians affected by internal conflict.  
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Epilogue 
 
Shortly after the conclusion of this study, a peace agreement was reached in Abuja 
on May 5, 2006.  Regrettably the agreement was only signed by two of the four parties, 
the GoS and a faction of the SLM.  As highlighted in this study, issues such as legitimacy 
have been mentioned as concerns by the interviewees in any agreement reached. The 
absence of two of the negotiating parties from the Darfur peace deal certainly adds doubt 
as to the ability of the agreement to bring peace to Darfur and assist with the protection 
efforts.  Yet a politically structured mechanism has been agreed upon by some of the 
warring parties to revolve differences peacefully.  The humanitarian and security 
operations of the international community will hopefully stand to benefit from an 
agreement ending hostilities.  It is too soon to tell if the Darfur Peace Agreement might 
go down the path of other agreements involving Darfur such as the Humanitarian 
Ceasefire or if it will be honored.  Unfortunately, the premise by which the exclusive 
nature of the peace talks in Abuja have been faulted for have gotten even more selective 
with signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement.  Even before its implementation, the Darfur 
Peace Agreement already faces an uphill struggle.  The international community is bound 
to this new political settlement guiding its efforts to assist in alleviating the suffering of 
those left in the wake of conflict.  Hopefully, this will be the last chapter in the wide 
spread violence which has plagued the inhabitants of Darfur.    
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Appendix A: Masters thesis Interview Questions: 
 
Note to the interviewee: 
               You can stop the interview at anytime 
               Confidentiality of person and organization 
               All data will be erased after the thesis is written  
               Send copy of transcript for review (if requested) 
               Copy of thesis (if requested) 
               Definition of terms is provide below  
               Please ask for clarification if there is anything you dont understand 
 
Definitions:   
International community:  the United Nations (UN), its regional partners, member states, 
and supporting agencies. 
 
Protection of Civilians:  Structures and Policies developed by the United Nations, States 
and other humanitarian actors, and based in humanitarian law, human rights and refugee 
law, to protect vulnerable populations from the effects of armed conflict, ranging from 
the most immediate priorities of minimizing civilian causalities to more long-term 
priorities of promoting rule of law and security, law and order within a State (OCHA, 
2003). 
 
 Please answer the following Interview Questions: 
1.  How have you come to take an interest in the conflict in Darfur? 
 
2.  What role has your organization played in assisting in the providing protection for 
Darfur people of Darfur? 
 
3.  How has the international community impacted the safety of the civilians of Darfur 
since its involvement in the region in terms of addressing their most immediate priorities 
(i.e. physical safety)? 
 
4.  How has the international community impacted the safety of the civilians of Darfur 
since its involvement in the region in terms of addressing their more long-term priorities 
(i.e. right of return)? 
 
5.  Based on your experiences what do you view as the problems the international 
community is encountering in providing for protection of civilians in terms of their most 
immediate priorities (i.e. physical safety)? 
 
6.  Based on your experiences what do you view as view as the problems the international 
community is encountering in providing for protection of civilians in terms of their more 
long-term priorities (i.e. right of return)? 
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7.  How can the international community best address the problems it is encountering 
regarding civilian protection in terms of their most immediate priorities (i.e. physical 
safety)? 
 
8.  How can the international community best address the problems it is encountering 
regarding civilian protection in terms of their more long-term priorities (i.e. right of 
return)? 
 
9.  How do you foresee the application of the power sharing, wealth sharing, and 3rd 
party security arrangements in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the south 
of Sudan as being applied in Darfur to better the international communitys protection 
efforts?  
 
10.  What direction is the international community headed in Darfur in terms of 
protecting civilians by addressing both their most immediate priorities and their more 
long-term priorities? 
 
11.  Anything else you would like to add? 
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Appendix B: Codebook 
 
Research Question A) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the 
international community has encountered in addressing the most immediate 
protection priorities of the civilians of Darfur? (refer to text 5.1) 
 According the definition of the protection of civilians most immediate protection 
priorities are defined as civilian causalities. This question refers to what problems have 
the international community experienced in impacting their actual physical safety. This is 
divided up into three categories. 
 
Category 1: International communitys approach to third party security presence (refer 
to text 5.1.1) 
Approach to security refers to any comments made concerning the problems of 
international communitys (IC) sponsored present in Darfur led by the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) or just as the African Union (AU) affecting their ability to 
minimize civilian causalities.  This includes references to troops, military personnel, and 
observers under the command of the AU. 
 
Variable 1: Strategy (refer to text 5.1.1.1): all answers concerning the problems of 
direction or guidance of the security approach by the AU.  Examples from the 
interviewees include: 
non-interventionist, Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement monitoring mode. 
peace keeping operation 
deployed under monitoring strategy 
 
Variable 2: Manpower (refer to text 5.1.1.2): all answers referring to the issues of 
size in number of personnel of AU force. Examples include:  
Troop capacity too small 
we were too few 
AU would protect, but they are too small, they are not strong enough... 
 
Variable 3:  Mandate (refer to text 5.1.1.3): all answers dealing with the problems 
of the authoritative command or mandate given to AMIS to operate under by a higher 
power. Examples include:  
You have the AU force, limited mandate, and bad mandate for political reasons 
[]. Its very difficult for the AMIS to go out to provide for the protection of 
civilians. 
There is a lack of mandate 
The mandate is weak; it should be stronger given the task. 
 
Variable 4: Logistics (refer to text 5.1.1.4): all answers concerning the 
problems with resource capacity, equipment, and general support to AMIS security 
mission. Examples include: 
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No capacity for intelligent administration, communication, or transportation 
Capabilities are also a big issue 
poorly equipped. 
 
Variable 5: Expertise (refer to text 5.1.1.5): all answers about problems 
with training, interactions in certain situations, and general knowledge of the operations 
of the AMIS. Examples include: 
Regardless of the fact that we had neither the resources even the expertise to 
under take a mission at the time we did. 
They lacked police training, they werent very professional police 
 
 Variable 6: Relationship between the AU and the UN (refer to text 5.1.1.6): all 
answers concerning problems with the relationship or communication between the AU 
and the UN.  Examples include:  
 the UN is almost at antagonistic relationships with the AU. 
But I know there is talking process, there is a communication problem with the 
AU and UN Security Council as well as NATO. 
 
Category 2: Humanitarian protection by presence strategy (refer to text 5.1.2) 
Refers to any problems encountered by humanitarian operations in regards to their 
strategy concerning protection.  Protection by presence strategy deals with all concerns 
directed at the approach the humanitarian organizations have taken with their procedures, 
practices, and strategies involving protection or security in being present.  Examples 
include: 
goal in starting the project there is to have a presence, to have a protection by 
presence strategy. However, I dont think it works very well. 
Well, it was very a much protection by presence in many ways.  Just by being 
there we averted some bad things from happening.  And testimony to that was as 
soon as we left the camp, bad things started to happen. 
They [AMIS] were to suppose to reside in the camp, my organization built them a 
shelter so they could stay over in the camp overnight, but they never did.  
 
Category 3: Government of Sudan (GoS) obstacles encountered by the IC (refer to text 
5.1.3) 
Refers to the problems perceived as generated by the GoS which has hinder the ICs 
security and humanitarian operations in impacting their ability to minimize civilian 
causalities.   
 Variable 1: Lack of control (refer to text 5.1.3.1): any references to the GoS not 
being able to control, disarm, or stop its militia groups such as the Janjaweed.  Examples 
include:  
The [GoS] president had promised to the secretary general to disarm the 
Janjaweed that was a promise made on the first of July 2004, but he didnt do it. 
 I just dont think the GoS can disarm the Janjaweed. 
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 Variable 2: Blocking of the ICs tactical efforts (refers to text 5.1.3.2): answers 
that mention the harassment of IC personnel, blocking or slowing down the delivery of 
equipment and supplies for IC operations. Examples include:  
People have been stopped at the airport and refused to go out of the airport even 
though they have the proper ID. 
Even beginning in summer of 2004 there were many obstacles that Khartoum put 
up, these were travel obstacles, in the importation of medical equipment.  This 
equipment had to be tested in Sudanese laboratories. 
Denying entry to AU helicopters, fuel, and the armor personnel carriers from 
Canada which had to wait in Senegal for many months. 
  
Research question B) According to the professionals, what can be done to address 
these problems in order to more effectively impact the immediate protection 
priorities of the civilians of Darfur? (refer to text 5.2) 
This question refers to the solutions of the problems stated under research question 
A which the international community is experiencing in impacting civilians actual 
physical safety in an effort to minimize causalities. This is as well is divided up into the 
three previously stated categories. 
 
Category 1: Solutions to ICs approach to security (refer to text 5.2.1) 
Approach to security refers to any comments made concerning the solutions to the 
problems experienced by the international communitys (IC) sponsored presence in 
Darfur led by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) or just as the African Union 
(AU) affecting their ability to minimize civilian causalities.  This includes references to 
troops, military personnel, and observers under the command of the AU. 
Variable 1: Changing Strategy (refers to text 5.2.1.1): all comments concerning the 
solutions to the problems of direction or guidance of the security approach by the AU.  
Examples from the interviewees include: 
We need a peacemaking, not a peacekeeping force because there is no peace to 
keep. 
But in Darfur, we need them in much more robust way. Yeah, you can call it a 
peace-enforcement operation.  
 
 Variable 2: Increase manpower (refers to text 5.2.1.2): any references to increasing 
the size and strength of the security force in Darfur. Examples include: 
I have always asked for a bigger and stronger force with a broader mandate. 
we are looking at ways and means of acquiring more force multipliers and 
enablers so that we can better protect. 
 
Variable 3: Strengthen Mandate (refers to text 5.2.1.3): recommendations to 
strengthen, broaden, improve, increase protection activities, make more robust or 
change to a chapter seven, the mandate to protect for the AU. Examples include: 
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Of course if you had a stronger mandate, chapter seven you then could have 
better protection of civilians. 
I personally think that it is time to move the AMIS peace support operation from a 
chapter six mandate to a higher level, chapter seven. 
 
Variable #4:  Improve Logistics (refers to text 5.2.1.4): suggestions pertain 
to more resource support, specific equipment requests, and capacity for the AU. 
Examples include: 
Getting the kind of logistical support, airlifting in supplies, and getting additional 
kind of vehicles 
We need more helicopters to improve the security situation. 
 
Variable #5: Training to increase expertise (refers to text 5.2.1.5):  
recommendations for the AMIS to be trained in sensitivity matters and have knowledge 
on the background of the conflict situation in Darfur. Examples include: 
 There needs to be sensitivity training for AMIS personnel. 
These guys [AMIS] need to be brief on situation as to what the conflict is about.   
  
 Variable #6: Relationship between the AU and the UN with command of security 
transferring to the UN (refer to text 5.2.1.6): Suggestions for transferring command, 
control, and leadership from the AU to the UN along with maintaining relationship or 
partnership.  Examples include: 
to replace the AU with actual blue helmet [UN] peacekeepers with an actual 
mandate to protect people. 
if the UN are so lucky to keep the AU troops that are present at the moment, but 
make them UN troops. 
 
Category 2: Continuous presence (refers to 5.2.2) 
Refers to solutions proposed to the problems encountered by humanitarian operations 
strategy. Solution to Humanitarian strategy suggests an increased/constant presence of IC 
personnel such as the AMIS living around the clock to better POC. Examples include:  
We have done a lot of pressuring to get the AMIS to have a presence around the 
camps and that has made a big difference. 
 The AMIS needs to reside in the displacement camps. 
 
Category 3: Application of smart and political sanctions (refer to text 5.2.3) 
 Refers to proposals to address the problems  the GoS has in controlling their 
activities such as their militia groups or the obstacles put in place to hinder the efforts of 
the ICs humanitarian and security efforts.  These solutions deal with the usage or 
application of smart sanctions for individuals in leadership positions of the warring 
parties or political sanctions which address government as a whole.  Examples include: 
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Oh yes, continue with the sanctions on the basis of 1591, Security Council 
Resolution, economic sanctions which would make sense, but not sanctions 
against the population, but sanctions against those who are responsible. 
You know smart sanctions is a concept that can be developed. 
I think these political sanctions are more, like the AU chairmanship debacle now.  
I think that it was a fairly tough lesson to learn. 
 
Research Question C) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the 
international community has encountered in addressing the more long term 
protection priorities of the civilians in Darfur? (refer to text 5.3) 
 According to the definition of the protection of civilians, the more long term 
protection priorities of the civilians refer to promoting rule of law and security within a 
state to foster an environment of return for the displaced. The problems the IC has 
experienced in this respect center on the political or diplomatic challenges faced by the 
IC. These come under six categories 
 
Category 1: Lack of commitment (refer to text 5.3.1) 
Answers include the lack or deficiency in committing, honoring, disregard or adhering to 
politically negotiation agreements by the warring parties. 
Disregard for the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement by all parties in the conflict 
is the single most attributed source for the lack of protection and physical safety of 
civilians. 
The international community has limitations, this is a huge place, until you have 
some kind of commitment by the authorities to live up to agreements to control the 
people that need to be controlled,  The ability and the strength of the international 
community is limited, it cant do the impossible. 
 
Category 3: Peace Process in Abuja (refer to text 5.3.2) 
 This refers to issues within the peace talks either as to the composition of the parties 
negotiating or the AUs handling of the talks. These are divided up into five variables. 
Variable #1: Legitimacy in Abuja (refer to text 5.3.2.1) 
Legitimacy refers to rights dictated by law. The peace talks are viewed as not being 
legitimate due to the exclusive or limited nature of representation of people and parties in 
the political negotiation environment. Examples include:  
Here in the case in Darfur you have a legitimacy question, but the question can 
they actually deliver, are the people with them. 
Not many people feel representative by the rebels.  The rebels dont do anything 
to get support, for instance they dont care for the IDPs. 
but there are many parties who not even present in Abuja such as the Arab 
militia groups. 
 
Variable #2: Fragmentation (refers to text 5.3.2.2): all comments direct at the 
division, split, or lack of unity within the warring parties. Examples include: 
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 Yeah, but also rebel movements who are split, warlords. 
 They have tried to unite them all in the SLM and the JEM, the SLM has 
 broken into factions. 
  
 Variable #3: Quality of the Leadership (refers to text 5.3.2.3): all comments 
directed at the leaders of the rebel movements described as warlords or lacking in 
education or leadership. Examples include: 
They lack good leaders and good negotiators. 
They have very little education. 
Big gap, quality not very high among the leaders 
 
 Variable #4: Quality of the Negotiators (refers to text 5.3.2.4): all comments 
towards the negotiators in Abuja concerning their connection to the region of Darfur. 
Examples include: 
...if you talk with the leaders in Abuja and you ask where do you live? 
Birmingham, sir; Amsterdam, sir; I am coming from Chicago.  They all come from 
outside.  It really means they dont have a real life need to change their own 
situation outside.  
 
 Variable #5: Overfacilitation of peace talks (refers to text 5.3.2.5): all references to 
the way in which the AU is carrying out the peace talks by overfacilitating.  Examples 
include: 
They are being paid to negotiate, not being paid to reach a result.  To reach a 
result would mean for many they would not get a per diem anymore. They dont 
have a power organization. So why should they reach a result? 
Now they are overfacilitated from the outside, they are feather bedding. 
  
 
Category #4: Lack of a functioning ceasefire agreement (refer to text 5.3.3) 
All comments directed at the lack of a working, effective, or functioning ceasefire 
agreement, institution or mechanism in place between the warring parties in Darfur. 
Examples include:  
 the ceasefire agreement from NDjamena which is flawed fully. 
Fifthly, they set up a ceasefire agreement and an institution to address the issues 
if there would be a problem, now the institution doesnt work. 
 
Category #5: Political power (refer to text 5.3.4) 
All references to the issue of political power sharing between parties including issues of 
past agreements of political power sharing such as the CPA. 
Examples include: 
the issue of the power sharing arrangement with the CPA; it is now more 
difficult to solve the crisis in Darfur. 
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political groups with limited popular mandate, they have monopolized power 
for their own benefit.  
  
Category #6: Wealth sharing (refer to text 5.3.5) 
Comments dealing with the problems encountered by the sharing of wealth. Issues 
include access and competition over land and environmental degradation and past 
agreements such as the CPA. 
Examples include: 
 issues of land. 
One of the most important levels that dictates one of the more long term levels of 
the war is the environmental degradation, competition for land.   
 
Research Question D) According to the professionals, what can be done to address 
these problems in order to more effectively impact the long term protection 
priorities of the civilians of Darfur? (refer to text 5.4) 
 The solutions to the problems presented are in regards to the more long term 
protection priorities of the civilians referring to the promotion of the rule of law and 
security within a state to foster an environment of return for the displaced. These 
solutions fall the six previously listed categories. 
 
Category #1: Credible commitment theory to address the lack of commitment (refers to 
text 5.4.1) 
 These recommendations deal with addressing the lack of commitment of the warring 
parties to a negotiated agreement by the principles of the Walters credible commitment 
theory (2002) in Abuja or embodied in the CPA for the long term protection needs of 
civilians. This refers to their application or relevance as a long term solution. Examples 
include: 
Well obviously a political solution has to include power and wealth sharing. 
I think, yes, I think the basic principles of the CPA can be applied to the situation 
in Darfur. 
Basically, I do not see it as a long term solution, but it will lay the foundations. 
 
Category #2: Elections, composite mandate, and Darfur-Darfur dialogue (refers to text 
5.4.2) 
These recommendations are for the lack of legitimacy, representation of the people or 
parties from the negotiations. This elections, participation, or application of different 
devices such a composite mandate to address the legitimacy question. It also refers to 
supplementing the peace talks in Abuja by getting local mechanisms in place and the 
holding of Darfur-Darfur dialogue for the reconciliation process. Examples include: 
 We need elections to get a kind of consensus. 
 an agreement that is owned by the people, such as elections and so on. 
There will be more Chapter VII, than chapter six.  I will it a composite mandate, 
simple language, Chapter VI for the good guys, chapter seven for the bad guys.  
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Those who are reaching a peace agreement in Abuja can be rewarded with a 
chapter six mandate. You want us to help, you to keep the peace, but there are 
many people who are not even present in Abuja. 
There are many, many local mechanisms for conflict resolution.  We hope 
through the Darfur-Darfur conference these mechanisms will come into play.  
...you could have a Darfur-Darfur dialogue leading to much better outcomes of 
wealth and power [sharing] than to the provisional outcomes of Abuja.  
 
Category #3: Working ceasefire agreement (refers to text 5.4.3) 
Answers pertaining to a getting a functioning or working ceasefire mechanism, device or 
agreement in place that is not violated.  Examples include: 
 There is a need to have a proper ceasefire agreement 
 That means I am very strongly in favor of a strong ceasefire agreement 
 
Category #4: Decentralize political power (refers to text 5.4.4) 
Suggestions for addressing the political power issue within the peace negotiations such 
the decentralization of power. Examples included: 
They must include the local parties and Khartoum, the AU, the Darfurians 
themselves and they will only go for a political system that is very decentralized. 
to decentralize as much as possible 
 
Category #5: Land reform (refers to text 5.4.5) 
Suggestions for solving wealth power problems in the political negotiations with 
mechanisms addressing the land issue with land reform examples include access to land 
or compensation for property.  Examples included. 
the international community has tried to impact the long term safety of civilians 
by addressing the land issue, right of return, all the related issues, part of the 
negotiations.  
access to land, right of return and you will see when the text is finalized that we 
have a lot of that. 
  
 
